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Department of Physics and Astronomy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208
A new approach to quantum cryptography to be called KCQ, keyed communication in quantum
noise, is developed on the basis of quantum detection and communication theory for classical
information transmission. By the use of a shared secret key that determines the quantum states
generated for different data bit sequences, the users may employ the corresponding optimum
quantum measurement to decode the data. This gives them a better error performance than an
attacker who does not know the key when she makes her quantum measurement, and an overall
generation of a fresh key may be obtained from the resulting advantage. This principle is illustrated
in the operation of a concrete qubit system A general information-theoretic description of the
overall approach will be presented, and contrasted with the detection/coding description necessary
for specific protocols. It is shown that the attacker’s error probability profile is needed for a
complete assessment of her information on the generated key. The criterion of protocol efficiency
and its sensitivity to system parameter fluctuation is proposed as another benchmark on the
evaluation of key generation protocols. For systems described by infinite-dimensional state spaces
referred to as qumodes, KCQ key generation schemes with coherent states of considerable energy
will be presented together with corresponding security analysis. Various advantage enhancement
and randomization techniques are introduced for improving the security and efficiency of such
protocols. A specific m-ary coherent orthogonal signaling scheme, CPPM, is presented that can
yield efficient secure key generation over long-distance telecomm fibers using conventional optical
technology. The issue of secrecy in direct encryption using KCQ is also discussed in general and in
connection with the αη protocol, on which experimental progress has been made. It is indicated
that information-theoretic security against known-plaintext attack is possible, which has never
been suggested for any cryptosystem. In particular, it is shown that CPPM offers information-
theoretic security against known-plaintext attacks while the data are unconditionally secure.
Some qualitative comparison among the different key generation schemes are made from both a
fundamental and a practical viewpoint. Further quantitative development, the detailed analysis of
direct encryption, and the effects of various advantage enhancement techniques would be presented
in future papers of this series. Some apparent gaps in the unconditional security proofs of previ-
ous protocols are indicated in Appendix A. The core of the paper is contained in sections III and VI.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, the study of cryptographic
protocols with security built on the basis of quantum
effects, has been mainly developed along the line of the
original BB84 protocol [1] and its variations [2]. The
focus is on key generation (key expansion [64]), the es-
tablishment of a fresh key [3] between two users, which is
often referred to in the literature as quantum key distri-
bution [65]. Without the use of quantum effects, it was
known that (classical) key generation is possible when-
ever the user and the attacker have different observations
(ciphertexts) from which the user can derive a perfor-
mance advantage [4, 5, 6], a process to be referred to
as advantage creation [66]. In BB84 type [67] quantum
cryptographic schemes, advantage creation is obtained
through intrusion-level detection [68] that quantitatively
assures the attacker’s observation to be inferior to the
users’, thus allowing privacy distillation (amplification)
[9] to essentially eliminate the attacker’s information on
the final key generated. Classically, this approach can-
not succeed because the attacker can always, in principle,
clone a copy identical to the user’s observation, and no
advantage can possibly be created. Quantum mechani-
cally, there is a general tradeoff between the attacker’s
disturbance and her information on the user’s observa-
tion. By estimating the intrusion level, the user can
(probabilistically) assure a better observation for decod-
ing the original data, from which a fresh key may be
generated.
There are several problems, in theory and in practice,
with the BB84 type [69] quantum protocols. Among
them are the necessity of using weak but accurate signal
source, a near perfect transmission line, sensitive and fast
quantum detectors, as well as the difficulties of having
appropriate amplifiers or repeaters to compensate loss,
developing specific practical protocols with quantfiable
∗The present version v.6 is improved over v.4 which is identical to
v.5.
†Electronic address: yuen@ece.northwestern.edu
security against all realistic attacks, and achieving rea-
sonable efficiency with such protocols. These problems
are summarized in Section VIII and a few hitherto un-
analyzed problems are summarized in Appendix A. As
a consequence, the usefulness of BB84 type protocols is
severely curtailed, especially for commercial applications.
Most of these problems can be traced to the need of mea-
suring the intrusion level for balance between the user
and attacker’s information on the data, and the neces-
sity of using weak signals. In this paper, a new type of
quantum protocols, to be called KCQ (keyed communi-
cation or keyed CDMA in quantum noise), is presented.
They do not need to involve intrusion-level detection and
permit the use of coherent states with considerable en-
ergy, thus alleviating the above problems. They can be
implemented using optical technology and readily inte-
grated with existing optical communication formats. It
is hoped that they would quickly bring quantum cryp-
tography to practical application.
The basic idea of KCQ is to utilize a shared secret
key between the users to determine the quantum signal
set [70] to be chosen separately for each information se-
quence, the quantum noise being inherent in the quantum
signal set from quantum detection and communication
theory [10, 11, 12, 13]. Such shared secret keys have also
not been used in classical key generation [6]. On the other
hand, the use of a shared secret key is necessary in BB84
type protocols and classical public discussion protocols
[6] for the purpose of message authentication or realizing
the public channel. In contrast, a shared secret key is uti-
lized in an essential way on KCQ protocols, but a fresh
key can be generated that is much larger than the secret
key used during key generation. For KCQ key genera-
tion, advantage creation is obtained from the different
optimal or near-optimal quantum receiver performance
between the user who knows the key and the attacker
who does not when she makes her quantum measure-
ment, even when a copy of the quantum signal is granted
to the attacker for the purpose of bounding her informa-
tion without intrusion-level detection. This difference in
performance has no classical analog. The KCQ approach
evolves from the anonymous key encryption method de-
scribed in Ref. [14]. Exactly how and why this approach
3works is explained both generally and concretely in this
paper.
In practice, infinite dimensional state spaces to be re-
ferred as qumodes provide the standard framework for
describing coherent-state laser signals. As in classical
communication systems, qumode systems allow the sup-
pression of errors with signal energy without error con-
trol coding that may complicate security proofs and hin-
der the development of specific protocols. Also, KCQ
can be used for direct encryption, which has different
security performance criteria for key generation apart
from the inefficient one-time pad approach. The basic
use of KCQ in binary and m-ary detection of coherent-
state qumode systems will be described. In particular,
a specific coherent pulse-position modulation scheme, to
be called CPPM, is shown to have many dramatic char-
acteristics including automatic privacy distillation, se-
cure key generation and data transmission over long-
distance telecomm fibers, and information-theoretic secu-
rity against known-plaintext attacks. This last character-
istics is impossible in conventional cryptography, the pos-
sibility of which has also never been suggested in quan-
tum cryptography. These qumode results are presented
in sections V and VI, and direct encryption briefly de-
scribed section VII. They are qualitatively compared to
other quantum key generation (QKG) schemes in section
VIII. Detailed quantitative development of CPPM and
other schemes for operation in realistic environment will
be given in the future.
Key generation via KCQ on qubits is developed in Sec-
tions II. In Section III, a general analysis of the KCQ ap-
proach and QKG security against joint attacks are pre-
sented with the more complete criterion of error profile
instead of mere mutual information. A protocol efficiency
criterion on QKG protocols is introduced in Section IV,
which should be insensitive to system parameter fluctua-
tion for a protocol to be realistically useful. In Appendix
A, we briefly discuss some serious gaps in the QKG un-
conditional security proofs against joint attacks given in
the literature. In Appendix B, we respond to several
criticisms on αη, a coherent-state KCQ scheme for direct
encryption upon which significant experimental progress
has been made. For readers who want to go directly to
the core of our new results, please read sections III, V,
and VI.
II. KCQ QUBIT KEY GENERATION
We consider a specific KCQ qubit scheme for key gen-
eration, to be called qk, to introduce and explain the
characteristics of the KCQ approach to quantum cryp-
tography.
Let an arbitrary qubit state be represented by a real
vector on the Bloch-Poincare sphere. As depicted in Fig.
1, an even number of M points uniformly distributed on
a fixed great circle on the sphere, corresponding to M/2
possible orthonormal bases, are used as possible quan-
tum signal states for the bit value b = 0, 1. The oppo-
site points on a diameter of the circle for a given basis
are the two orthonormal states for the two possible bit
values. The two neighbors of each of the M points are
taken to represent a different bit value. A shared secret
key K between two users, Adam (A) and Babe (B), is
used to select a specific basis for each qubit. A secret
polarity bit may also be introduced to be added to the
data bit for randomizing the polarity of the basis. In-
stead of using the same K for each b, a long running
key K ′ obtained from the output of a standard (classi-
cal) encryption mechanism with K as the input may be
used to yield different basis selection and polarity bits
for different b’s in an n-sequence of input data Xn. This
is depicted in Fig. 1 where, e.g., the ENC box may rep-
resent a synchronous stream cipher or even just a linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) for the key extension [71].
Thus, generally a total of 1 + log2(M/2) bits from K
′
would be used to determine the polarity bit and the se-
lection of one of M/2 possible bases.
The key generation process goes as follows. Adam
picks a random n-bit data sequence Xn, modulating n
corresponding qubits by using K ′ to determine the po-
larity and basis for each qubit. Babe generates the same
K ′ to decide on the quantum measurement basis for each
b in Xn, and decode the bit value by the corresponding
measurement. A classical error correcting code (CECC)
may be used on the n-sequence to eliminate noise in the
system that may originate anywhere, including source,
transmission line, and detector. Privacy distillation may
then be employed to bring the attacker Eve (E)’s bit er-
ror rate P bE on the final key K
g to any desired small level.
Intrusion-level detection is avoided by granting E a full
copy of the quantum signal for the purpose of bounding
her information. Advantage creation is obtained from
the different (optimal) quantum receiver performance, in
an individual or joint attack, between B who knows K
and E who does not. Further data and signal keyless ran-
domization may be introduced by A to guarantee security
against joint attack and to improve the key-bit genera-
tion efficiency kgeff . Finally, the new keyK
g is verified to
be correct by the use of another short key Kv, which may
be done openly (publicly, i.e., the ciphertext is available
to E). All these steps and features would be described
and explained in detail in this and the following sections.
There are significant theoretical and practical advantage
of the qk scheme of Fig. 1 as compared to BB84. In par-
ticular, it can handle all system imperfection and noise
of any origin at the same time, and produce reasonable
key-bit generation efficiency kgeff .
The substantive use of secret keys in the key genera-
tion process other than message authentication has been
introduced before [14, 15, 17], In particular, it has been
used in [15, 17] in selecting one of the two possible bases
in BB84 for improving kgeff , while keeping the other pro-
tocol steps including intrusion-level detection intact. In
contrast, the security of our KCQ scheme is derived from
a different quantum principle, the difference in optimal
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FIG. 1: The qk scheme. Left — two neighboring bases, I and II. Right — overall encryption involves modulation with bases
determined by a running key K′ generated from the seed key K via an encryption mechanism denoted by the box ENC.
quantum receiver performance with and without the key,
rather than the information/disturbance tradeoff under-
lying BB84 and related schemes. Our use of a long run-
ning keyK ′ and largeM is not only essential in obtaining
high kgeff , it is also essential for obtaining complexity-
based security against known-plaintext attacks when KQ
is used for direct encryption. It also plays a role in yield-
ing reasonable key generation rates for coding-theoretic
protocols with unconditional security. In contrast, the
unconditional security proof described in Ref. [17] is
not complete even with intrusion-level detection, due to
the quantum state correlation or memory among differ-
ent qubits induced by the shared secret key, in addition
to the previous problems in such security proofs are de-
scribed in Appendix A. Indeed, it is a major problem in
using a secret key that one needs to show there is a net
resulting key generated after subtracting the original key
used, or that the system is somehow worth the |K| cost.
Most significantly, the use of shared secret keys in our
KCQ approach makes possible the development of large-
signal schemes with conventional optical technology as
described in sections V and VI.
We first analyze the security of the above qk scheme
under joint attack on the seed key K and a specific kind
of individual attack on the data X , given the quantum
ciphertext. In contrast to data encryption, there is no
known-plaintext attack [3] in key generation because one
presumes A can generate completely random data bits
unknown to both B and E a priori. The problem of
how this can be done at high rate is a separate issue
common to every kind of cryptography. The term ‘in-
dividual attack’ is ambiguous, but the attack considered
in the quantum cryptography literature under this la-
bel usually refers to the situation where E prepares the
probe/interaction to each qubit of the quantum signal se-
quence individually and identically, measures each of her
probe individually and identically, and processes the re-
sulting information independently [72] from one qubit to
the other. Since, for bounding E’s information, we grant
E a copy of the quantum signal sequence, the optimal
performance of which clearly provides an upper bound on
E’s performance with an actual inferior copy obtained
via a probe, there is no question of probe/interaction in
the attack on such systems, only individual-qubit ver-
sus collective measurements. Possible disruption of the
signal by E will be discussed in Sections III.F. The indi-
vidual attack on the data analyzed quantitatively in the
following is of the same nature as that in the BB84 liter-
ature [2], namely a constant measurement on each qubit
and independent processing. We will call such attacks
constant individual attacks.
Such an attack does not include all possible attacks
within a reasonable limitation on E’s technology, in both
the BB84 and our schemes. If one may limit E’s measure-
ment to individual qubit ones, perhaps because measure-
ment across many qubits is difficult to make [73], there
is no reason to limit E’s classical processing after mea-
surement to qubit-by-qubit separately, except for ease of
analysis! A more detailed general classification of attacks
and their analysis will be provided in the future.
Generally, let ρkx be the quantum state corresponding
to the data x [74] (single bit or a bit sequence) and run-
ning key sequence k [75] that is used to determine the
basis and/or polarity of the qk scheme for that length
of x. For M/2 possible bases and a single bit x, there
is 1 + log2(M/2) bits in k for both basis and polarity
determination. Each ρkx can be represented as a real vec-
tor |rkx〉 of norm 1 on the great circle, the angle between
any two nearest neighbor vectors is 2π/M radian. The
quantum ciphertext available to E for upperbounding her
performance is ρkx where both x and k are random.
For the purpose of attacking the key, the quantum ci-
phertext reduces to ρk =
∑
x pxρ
k
x where px is the a
priori probability of the data x. By an optimal mea-
surement on the qubits, the probability of correctly iden-
tifying the key is obtained from ρk via quantum detec-
tion theory. We may let x be any n-sequence, so that
ρkx = ρ
k
x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρkxn . Let px = 1/2n for each n-bit se-
quence. It is easily seen from the quantum modulation
format that
∑
x pxρ
k
x = ⊗n(I/2) where I is the qubit
5identity operator, irrespective of the nature of k. Thus,
ρk is independent of k and the quantum ciphertext pro-
vides no information on k at all. Specifically, any pro-
cessing on ρk yields an a posteriori probability on k equal
to the a priori probability pk, which may be chosen to be
uniform for maximum security.
Consider now the attack on x, through the decision
on x from measurement on the quantum ciphertext in
state ρx =
∑
k pkρ
k
x. For individual attacks of the kind
described above, one obtains ρx corresponding to a single
bit by tracing out the rest of the data sequence. When
a polarity bit is used from k, it is easily seen that E’s
bit error probability is P bE = 1/2 by averaging on the
two polarities alone. When the polarity bit is not used,
ρ1 and ρ0 are different. The optimum P
b
E is given by
(1/2)−(1/4)||ρ1−ρ0||1 [10], in terms of the trace distance
||ρ1 − ρ0||1 between ρ1 and ρ0, which can be explicitly
evaluated for a single qubit, with resulting
P bE =
1
2
− 1
M
[
1− cos(π/M)
2 sin2(π/M)
]1/2
. (1)
This P bE goes as
1
2 − 12M for large M and can thus be
made arbitrarily small.
That it is unreasonable to consider only such limited
individual attacks can be seen as follows. Suppose a key
k of 1+log2(M/2) bits is used repeatedly to determine
the polarity and basis choice of each qubit state in a se-
quence. Even though the above individual attack error
rate for E is the ideal 1/2, in actuality E has a prob-
ability 2−|k|, |k| ≡ number of bits in k, of completely
decrypting x by guessing k and using it on every qubit
[76]. In a similar way, the same problem arises for a
running key obtained from a short seed key K. That
is, the correlation between bits in x due to k can be
exploited by joint classical processing [77] on individual
qubit measurements. The presence of the encryption box
in Fig. 1 does not improve the situation fundamentally
for information-theoretic security even if the seed key K
is long, because E can generate K ′ from a guessed K as
the encryption mechanism is openly known [78]. Before
we discuss general joint attacks in the next section, a
number of issues on the above development would first
be cleared up.
First, aside from information-theoretic security issue,
the encryption box in Fig. 1 always increases the secu-
rity of qk through physical and computational complex-
ity, and it also increases the efficiency of key-bit gen-
eration fundamentally. Since there is often a trade-off
between security and efficiency, increasing the efficiency
without compromising security is in a sense increasing
security (for a given efficiency). Suppose the encryption
box is a stream cipher that outputs a long running key
K ′ from a seed key K. If it is a maximum length LFSR
of |K| stages, then K ′ up to length 2|K| is ‘random’ in
various sense, even though an exact knowledge of K ′ of
length 2|K| is sufficient to determineK uniquely from the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [3]. If K is used repeatedly
without K ′ in Fig. 1, the ρkx would be correlated by
the repeated k for short x-sequence, with any reason-
able |K| and M . A joint (measurement) attack can then
be launched much more easily because the physical com-
plexity - in this case the correlated qubit measurement
- needed is much smaller than the one that comes from
a long K ′ from the same K. While K ′ is not open to
observation in the present case [79], computational com-
plexity obtains in any event when one attempts to corre-
late the different bits in x through the unknown key [80].
Computational complexity is an excellent security mech-
anism if can be shown to be exponential, as the Grover
search can only reduce the exponent by a factor of 1/2.
Long keys with |K| ∼ 103 can readily be used in stream
ciphers, and searching 2100 items is already far beyond
the capability of any imagined quantum computer. In
conventional cryptography [81], many stream ciphers are
used by themselves as the complete security mechanism.
It can be incorporated in schemes such as Fig. 1 or the
qumodes schemes of Refs. [18, 29] to increase the overall
security in direct encryption.
Second, if cloning is possible so that 2|K| copies of the
quantum ciphertext are available, there is no possibility
of key generation in principle. This is because E can use
the 2|K| different keys on the different copies, narrowing
down the data to exactly 2|K| possibilities correspond-
ing to the key uncertainty. She can then follow what-
ever processing the users employ on her own data, and
the users have succeeded only in obtaining a derived key,
not a fresh one, whose randomness comes entirely from
the original key without forward secrecy. This also ex-
plains why no key generation is possible when the user
and the attacker have the same observation. Note, how-
ever, the difference between cloning and having one full
copy. Having one copy is equivalent to the classical situ-
ation where many identical copies can be made, because
together they do not tell the input data better than just
one copy. Quantum mechanically, the quantum uncer-
tainty goes down with the number of copies available
from the laws of quantum physics - indeed the state is
in principle determined exactly, say by quantum tomog-
raphy, with an infinite supply of identical copies. Thus,
the classical analog of ‘cloning’ is the granting of one
identical copy, not many ones as in full cloning.
Third, the possibility of attacking the data x is not
completely described by ρx in general. This is because E
knows there is a ρkx representation. Thus, she can attack
the key via quantum measurement on part of the qubit
sequence, and then attack the data with any knowledge
she may thus learn. A similar but less serious situation
occurs for attacks on the key via partial attacks on the
data first. These possibilities, however, do not arise in
the case of constant individual attack.
Before turning to joint attacks, it should be noted that
security results against individual attacks are far from
useless. In practice, a joint attack may require corre-
lated qubit measurement, as the qubit states are corre-
lated through the running key K ′. Thus, the physical
6complexity of such quantum measurement and the com-
putational complexity introduced through the encryption
box would provide very significant security against at-
tacks that can be realistically launched in the foreseeable
future. When joint processing of the individual measure-
ment results is performed, the quantum noise introduced
in such individual measurement already yields a noisier
copy for the attacker that allows advantage distillation
by the user. This would distinguish our cryptosystem
as a truly quantum one that has no classical analog, and
give real meaning to the security claim against individual
attacks. Performance under different types of such ‘indi-
vidual attacks’, including ones involving adaptive qubit-
by-qubit measurements, will be presented in the future.
Consider the operation of qk of Fig. 1 for a perfect
qubit channel, under joint (collective) attack by E where,
as a performance bounding technique, she is supposed
to have a full identical copy of the n-sequence quantum
state as B. She has to make a quantum measurement,
however, without knowing the key which she may pos-
sess later — see section III.B for a complete description.
Here we would observe that she would not be able to
make a perfect decryption with probability equal to 1 for
any finite n. After whatever quantum measurement on
the n-qubits she made, she still would not be able to make
a perfect decryption if K is then given to her. This is be-
cause a perfect decryption occurs when and only when
the measurement she made is exactly that prescribed by
K. This shows that an advantage is created which may
lead to an unconditionally secure protocol with or with-
out the use of further channel coding, as shown in sec-
tion III.H. When channel noise is present, a classical er-
ror correcting code (CECC) on the quantum states may
be employed and separate privacy amplification may be
required. The exact quantitative performance will be de-
tailed elsewhere.
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF KCQ KEY
GENERATION
In this section, the basic principles underlying key gen-
eration via KCQ will be explained. The general princi-
ples of key generation will first be reviewed and analyzed,
extending the usual framework to include shared secret
keys and the more appropriate criterion of error profile
in addition to and in place of mutual information. The
quantum nature of KCQ will be pinpointed. The overall
steps and structure of a KCQ key generation protocol will
be exhibited, and the conditions for key generation estab-
lished. Various basic conditions on key generation will
be discussed, particularly in relation to the usual QKG
approach. This section III and the later qumode key gen-
eration section VI that gives the specific qumode QKG
protocol CPPM may be regarded as the heart and brain
of this paper. For a detailed review of the background
in classical as well as quantum detection and communi-
cation theory for classical information transmission that
is crucial for a complete understanding of these sections,
please see Ref. [13] and references cited therein. For a
development of optical communication theory that is im-
portant in fully comprehending the details of how KCQ
protocols work, please see also Ref. [37].
Consider an entire joint process of data transmission
and encryption/decryption as described in Fig. 2. A
sends an l-bit sequence Ul and encrypt/encode it into
an n-qubit or n-qumode sequence in state ρkx with the
possible use of a shared secret key k with B, which may
include a source code keyKs, a channel code keyKc, and
a quantum state modulation code key Km. Classically,
ρkx would be replaced by just an n-bit channel input se-
quence Xn corresponding to the x in ρ
k
x. The ‘channel’
represents all the interference from the system one has
to suffer, with Chi giving output qubit states for i =
E, B. For E who does not know k, the state is ρ˜x upon
which she picks a measurement on the basis of that and
her later knowledge from all sources including public dis-
cussion to produce an estimate KˆgE of K
g, the final key
generated by A and B. For B who knows k, the channel
output state is ρ˜kx from which she uses her knowledge of k
to obtain an estimate of UˆBl of Ul. Classically, the states
would be replaced by the observations Y En and Y
B
n , the
disturbed output of Xn. Quantum mechanically, they
are the results of corresponding optimal or near-optimal
measurements on the qubits or qumodes from which the
estimates UˆBl are made. One may first consider, for sim-
plicity, that Y En is obtained without knowledge of Km.
More generally, one may split ρkx into parts from which
attacks on x and on k are interwined. Privacy distillation
may already be incorporated in this process, or may be
added to Ul and Uˆ
B
l . The use of such an approach for
direct encryption is briefly treated in section VII.
The essential steps in the operation of a KCQ key gen-
eration protocol involve
(i) The use of a shared secret key Km between A and
B that determines the quantum states generated for the
data bit sequences in a detection/coding scheme between
A and B that gives them a better error performance over
E who does not know Km when she makes her quantum
measurement;
(ii) A way for A and B to extract a fresh key from the
above performance advantage;
(iii) A key verification process using another shared
secret key Kv between A and B.
The main novelty and power of this approach, in prin-
ciple, consists of
(a) Performance advantage is derived from the differ-
ent quantum receiver performance between B who knows
the key Km when she performs her quantum measure-
ment and E who knows Km only after she has made her
quantum measurement.
(b) No intrusion-level detection or even intrusion de-
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FIG. 2: General keyed communication in quantum noise.
tection is needed by A or B.
(c) No public discussion is needed between A and B.
(d) No separate privacy distillation, or reduction in the
key generation rate due to any such equivalent operation,
is needed in a properly designed system.
As a consequence, this approach makes possible the
development of an efficient, secure key generation proto-
col over long-distance telecomm fibers using commercial
optical technology. In the following, these points will
be fully explained and explicated. The contrast between
KCQ and the usual QKG approach, both in theory and
in practice, will be highlighted.
A. Principle of Key Generation
A key generation protocol with information-theoretic
security, whether it is based on classical or quantum
randomness, would consist of the following three logical
steps:
(i) Advantage Creation:
The users A and B create a communication situation
between themselves with an observed random variable
Y Bn for B that leads to a better error performance than
that obtained by E from her observed random variable
Y En and all her side information.
(ii) Error Correction:
The users agree on a generated string that is free of
error with high probability if E is absent.
(iii) Privacy Distillation:
The users derive from the generated string a generated
key Kg on which E’s error probability profile satisfies a
given security level.
The first step (i) may be achieved classically in the
presence of different noises for B and E’s communica-
tion channels with respect to A’s data, using perhaps the
help of public discussions between A and B. In the quan-
tum key generation approaches so far, (i) is achieved via
intrusion-level detection, explicit or implicit, that guar-
antees that A and B have a better communication line
than A and E in the sense of mutual information, which
is also the privacy distillation criterion used in step (iii).
The steps (ii) and (iii) could be combined by an error cor-
recting code, quantum or classical, that simultaneously
performs privacy distillation. This is indeed the way the
usual QKG unconditional security (existence) proofs in-
volving CSS codes [22, 23, 24, 25, 57] are carried out. In
QKG experiments to date, these steps are distinct and a
separate privacy distillation code is employed whenever
step (iii) is implemented. In our KCQ protocol called
CPPM in section VI, step (iii) is automatically achieved
in an ideal fashion from the m-ary signaling scheme em-
ployed. More generally, we will show that privacy am-
plification is unnecessary in most cases when the proper
criterion of E’s optimal error probability is used in place
of her mutual information.
8B. Advantage Creation with Shared Secret Key
In the literatures [4, 5, 6], it was shown that if a situa-
tion is obtained in which the mutual information between
A and B, I(XA;YB) for the random variables XA and YB
in A and B’s possessions, is bigger than that between A
and E, I(XA;YE), or that of B and E from the symmet-
rically inter-changeable roles of A and B, key generation
is possible. That is, an information-theoretic existence
proof is given under the condition
I(XA;YE) < I(XA;YB) (2)
with the conclusion that an asymptotic key generation
rate ∆I = maxp(XA)[I(XA;YB) − I(XA;YE)] is possible
between A and B with the (total) amount of mutual in-
formation E has on the key generated being arbitrarily
small. In these results, there is no shared secret key be-
tween A and B.
Such results can be generalized to include the use of
a shared secret key K as follows. E is going to observe
her channel output YE without the benefit of knowing
K. However, one has to make sure that the result-
ing Kg generated between A and B is fresh, i.e., sta-
tistically independent of K and E’s observation YE , i.e.
I(Kg;YEK) ∼ 0. Indeed, E can try every possible 2|K|
keys on her observation YE to determine the possible
XA’s. A conceptually convenient way to characterize this
situation is to give E the key K after she made her ob-
servation YE . Using the notation I(XA;YEK) to denote
her information in this situation where YEK denotes the
joint random variables YE and K, (2) generalizes to
I(XA;YEK) < I(XA;YB) (3)
In (3), B is of course supposed to knowK when she plans
to observe YB . Classically, the condition (3) may result
if there is a limit on the data storage so that E cannot
have the same observation as B who can just store the
relevant data using the knowledge of K, as in the broad-
cast scheme of Maurer. While the shared secret key K
is what occurs in the above I(XA;YEK) with which E
may use to estimate Kg in KCQ protocols, K may be
interpreted as all the side information E obtains in other
QKG protocols such as BB84, or as the missing informa-
tion that allows the conditional entropyH(X |YE ,K) = 0
in a classical random channel protocol. These useful in-
terpretation would be used later.
The following important relation between any three
random variables should be noted:
I(X ;Y K) = I(X ;Y |K) + I(X ;K) (4)
In the KCQ context, I(X ;K) = 0 and I(X ;YE |K) can
be used in lieu of I(X ;YEK). However, the distinction is
important and has various ramifications in the BB84 key
generation whenK is interpreted as E’s side information.
Quantum mechanically, the knowledge of Km that
specifies the mapping from classical data to quantum
states would allow B to choose the optimum or near-
optimum quantum measurement to discriminate among
the data. Without knowing Km, on the average E would
need to pick a quantum measurement that would allow
her to make reasonable estimates for different km’s, which
leads to an inferior performance compared to B for a spe-
cific km. This situation clearly obtains when E does not
have long-term quantum memory to hold her copy of the
quantum signal before she has to make a quantum mea-
surement to extract the information without knowing the
key. In practice, the key Km can be erased or kept secret
indefinitely from E, as E really would never have Km,
and she has to make a quantum measurement without
knowing K even if she has long-term quantum memory.
Classically, there is no need for E to know K in order for
her to be able to correlate in a definite manner the dif-
ferent data connected by K, such as the different session
keys generated from a master key. For example, with
the observations of x1 ⊕ k and x2 ⊕ k for two indepen-
dent bits x1 and x2 and a secret bit k, one knows exactly
x1⊕x2 while knowing nothing about k. In this quantum
situation, however, such correlation cannot be obtained
without quantum measurement on the quantum signals
that E possesses. Thus, E has to suffer the uncertainty
of picking her quantum measurement without knowing
K even if she has long-term quantum memory. This
is the principle underlying advantage creation in KCQ
protocols. Note that this is a quantum effect with no
classical analog, because classically E can always make
a complete observation of her received signal in princi-
ple. There would be no incompatible measurements as
in the quantum case. The following intuitive result re-
lated to the advantage of a shared secret key, as well as
the average effect of side information or missing informa-
tion, is useful in the analysis of classical and quantum
key generation.
Lemma 1: For any three joint random variables
X,Y,K,
I(X ;Y K) ≤ I(X ;Y ) +H(K). (5)
Proof: From I(X ;Y K) = H(X,K) − H(X |Y,K),
(5) is equivalent to H(Y ) + H(K) + H(X |Y,K) ≥
H(Y |X) + H(X). The left side of the last inequality
is ≥ H(X,Y,K) = H(X) + H(K|Y ) + H(X |Y,K) ≥
H(X,Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X), completing the proof.
According to (5), if K˜m represents the missing clas-
sical information in a channel with random parame-
ter that together with YE yields correct decryption, or
H(XA|YE , K˜m) = 0, then H(K˜m) is indeed the maxi-
mum possible amount of missed information, which may
not be large. For example, K˜m may represent the sig-
nal phase or amplitude variation caused by a classically
random channel. In the quantum case, however, no miss-
ing information can make up totally the loss from YB to
YE . There is irretrievable loss from the inferior quan-
9tum measurement as the quantum copy is expended upon
measurement.
C. Eve’s Information and Error Profile
The security criterion for key generation, classical or
quantum, has so far been limited to I(Kg;Y En ), the mu-
tual information between Eve’s observation Y En and the
final key Kg generated, with the provision that E’s side
information needs to be accounted for [33]. Except in
the limit I(Kg;Y En ) = 0 which says that K
g and Y En
are statistically independent, the information-theoretic
quantity I(Kg;Y En ) has no clear quantitative operational
significance with regard to the usefulness of Y En for Eve
in a eavesdropping context. One such operational crite-
rion is given by Eve’s trial complexity Ct as measured
by the average number of trials she needs to successfully
use trial keys on the basis of her information. For ex-
ample, when she knows nothing about Kg, which she
would guess in successive trials to, say, open a safe, she
would need an average of Ct = 2
|Kg|−1+1/2 trials to suc-
ceed. It would also describe E’s ability when she launches
a known-plaintext attack on Kg used in a standard ci-
pher. In general, Ct depends on her exact error profile
p(KˆgE = K
g|Y En ), the probability that given her informa-
tion, each of the 2|Kg| guessed sequence KˆgE is correct, as
given in the following equation (7).
This error profile E can obtain herself from the con-
ditional probability p(XA|YE), which is in turn specified
by her channel transition probability, the a priori data
probability, and the overall coding/communication for-
mat including possible deliberate randomization by A.
Furthermore, many different p(KˆgE = K
g|Y En ) leads to
the same H(Kg|Y En ) or I(Kg;Y En ) = |Kg| −H(Kg|Y En ),
which alone is not sufficient to capture E’s ability to
use her information. In the case I(Kg;Y En ) = 0,
p(KˆgE = K
g|Y En ) = 2−|K
g| for any KˆgE. It is not known
how I(Kg : Y En ) is related to Ct in general except in
the asymptotic limit when E can encode or interpret
I(Kg;Y En ) via asymptotic equipartition [34], which she
cannot since she does not control A’s data transmitter.
One may lower bound E’s average bit-error probability
PEb (K
g) by Fano’s inequality [34], which is valid for any
n-sequence Y En that may possess correlations among its
bit values. LetH2 be the binary entropy function. Fano‘s
inequality gives, in the present situation,
H2[P
E
b (K
g)] ≥ 1− I(Kg;Y En )/n. (6)
If I(Kg;Y En ) is exponentially small with exponent Λ, it
follows from (6) that 1/2−PEb (Kg) is exponentially small
with exponent Λ/2. However, the bit error rate is not
really meaningful in this connection because the bits may
be highly correlated in the way they affect Ct.
The following analysis shows that I(Kg;Y En ) is not a
sufficient measure of E’s capability unless it is really ex-
tremely small. One needs to supplement it at least by
p¯E = max p(Kˆ
g
E = K
g|Y En ), which is an important cri-
terion in our KCQ approach. The error profile gives the
probabilities p1 ≥ p2 · ·· ≥ pN , N = 2|Kg|, for each of the
N guesses KˆgE . Thus, p¯E = p1 and the trial complexity
Ct is
Ct =
N∑
n=1
npn. (7)
Given that E has IE bits of information on K
g, with
|Kg| = n, the largest p1 that can be obtained is given
by the error profile that spreads 1− p1 among the 2n− 1
other possibilities uniformly, i.e. , it is determined by the
equation
H2(p1) + (1− p1) log(2n − 1) = n− IE . (8)
Thus, p1 ∼ 2−l for IE ∼ n · 2−l and large n, and E needs
only about 1 bit of information out of |Kg| = 100 for
a possible error profile with p1 = 10
−2, a disastrous se-
curity bleach. This most favorable situation for E with
a given IE may be contrasted with her most unfavor-
able situation, where her 1 bit knowledge corresponds to
knowing one bit of the |Kg|-bit sequence exactly.
As we have just seen from (8), p1 can be made about as
large as the fraction of bits |Kg| that she knows through
IE . To ensure p1 ≤ 2−l through IE , one needs to impose
a strong requirement that I(Kg;Y En ) < n2
−l. In addi-
tion to the necessity of assessing the actual minimum Ct
attainable with a given I(Kg;Y En ), the above condition
on p1 alone would lead to l ∼ 100 for a truly secure sys-
tem, which is practically very difficult to obtain on the
basis of reducing I(Kg;Y En ) for realistic n. On the other
hand, a more detailed assessment of the error profile or
just p1 would give a more accurate estimate of E’s true
ability to use her information than the mere I(Kg;Y En )
as shown in the following.
Under the condition p1 ≤ 2−l, one obtains
Lemma 2:
When E’s optimum estimate of Kg has an error prob-
ability P¯Ee ≥ 1 − 2−l, her information on Kg satisfies
I(Kg;Y En ) ≤ n− l, n = |Kg|.
Proof:
Since p1 ≤ 2−l, it follows that l ≤ n. The maximum
IE is obtained when H({pi}) is minimized, which occurs
at p1 = · · · = pm = 2−l form = 2l, pm+1 = · · · = p2n = 0,
from the Schur-concavity [30] of H (which can actually
be seen to follow from concavity directly).
Although this bound is weak, it may be used to estab-
lish the existence of secure KCQ protocols under rather
general situations to be described in section III.H. Specif-
ically, we take the approach that instead of IE , pE ≤ 2−l
has to be imposed, which leads to Ct ≥ (2l +1)/2 similar
to Lemma 2.
Lemma 3:
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Let E’s optimal estimate of Kg have a success prob-
ability p¯E ≤ 2−l, then her trial complexity Ct is lower
bounded by Ct ≥ (2l + 1)/2.
Thus, regardless of her mutual information IE , Lemma
3 guarantees E’s trial complexity at a level that may al-
ready be satisfactory, and does that without privacy dis-
tillation. Note that a bound on Ct for given IE can be
obtained via (8) and Lemma 3. It follows from Lem-
mas 2 and 3 that it is much more useful to impose a
bound on p1 ≤ 2−80 for n = 100 that may correspond
to IE ∼ 20, than a bound on IE ≤ 1 that may corre-
sponds to p1 ∼ 10−2. Furthermore, e.g., a system with
|K| ∼ 20, n ∼ 200, l ∼ 100 would be quite useful regard-
less of what IE actually is.
In view of our replacement of a constraint on IE by
that of p¯E together with the corresponding elimination
of privacy distillation, the following comment is in or-
der. Privacy distillation moves E’s uncertainty among
n bits to n − l bits when IE ∼ l bits. If Kg is to be
used as one-time pad, such a move is necessary for near
perfect security level. However, Kg would often be used
as a seed key in some other cipher. In that case the
privacy distillation merely reduces the key size of Kg,
not its randomness to E as already observed in Ref. [8].
Particularly for stream ciphers which may have similar
speed and complexity for different key sizes, it may not
be worth the trouble to carry out any privacy distillation
before the raw Kg is used.
In attacking a KCQ system, E may always guess the
seed key Km and make corresponding optimum quantum
measurements to decrypt the data. Her success proba-
bility, however, is only p¯E = 2
−|K|. If she guessed the
keyKm incorrectly, the probability she would getKg cor-
rectly from Y En is exponentially small in n because differ-
ent keys km lead to different ρ
k
x for the same data. Fur-
thermore, she has only (at most) one copy of the quan-
tum signal (with energy at the designed security level in
the qumode case) to launch this attack once. This cor-
responds to the above error profile with p1 = 2
−|Km| but
no more than one trial. Note that the seed key Km has
to be guessed in total as it is not being used in a bit by
bit or segment by segment manner.
D. Key Rate of Secure Protocols
As is evident form Fig. 2, E has to deal with the
Xn chosen by A and has no independent way to en-
code her own channel I(Xn;Y
E
n ). Thus, by choosing
a rate R in between (2) and (3), one may be able to
force the second term in ∆I to be zero and obtain ∆I =
maxp(Xn) I(Xn;Y
B
n ) as a consequence of the Shannon
Coding Theorem and its Strong Converses [34, 36, 38, 39]
for memoryless channels. The Strong Converse states
that the block error rate goes to 1 exponentially in the
block length [5, 32] at rates above capacity, which may
already imply I(Xn;Y
E
n ) → 0 as will be seen in the
CPPM scheme of section VI. When a shared secret key
is used, the classical channels become ones with memory,
and the corresponding Coding Theorems and their Con-
verse [36, 38, 39] may be employed. Since such results
on channels with memory are typically weaker quantita-
tively, we may employ the memoryless results using the
following approach. A may transmit at an input bit rate
R satisfying
I(Xn;Y
E
n K)/n < R < I(Xn;Y
B
n )/n (9)
where I(Xn;Yn) refers to the mutual information be-
tween n-bit sequences. Let independent keys Ki, i ∈
{1, ...,m}, be the secret keys used for the ith n-sequence
xin, each randomly chosen from {0, 1}|K|. Then, by treat-
ing each xn sequence as a single word or symbol, we have
created a memoryless channel on the symbols. This is
because both E and B’s channel transition probabilities
for the different m symbols are the same, respectively.
As a consequence, the memoryless Coding Theorem and
its Strong Converse can be applied to yield the exis-
tence proof of a code that generates arbitrarily close to
mI(Xn;Y
B
n ) bits.
It should be noted that condition (9) already includes
the cost of the key |K| for net key generation. If one uses
instead the condition
I(Xn;Y
E
n )/n < R < I(Xn;Y
B
n )/n (10)
together with the net-key generation condition
|K| < ∆I ≡ I(Xn;Y En )− I(Xn;Y Bn ), (11)
it is more stringent than (9) from Lemma 1. If the system
is information-theoretic secure against known-plaintext
attacks for direct encryption, briefly discussed in section
VII and treated extensively in Part II, the keys may be
re-used because the different fresh keys generated from
two different uses of K are independent of each other. In
such a case, only condition (10) without condition (11)
needs to be satisfied. If the Ki are not re-used, a net key
generation rate is obtained under (3), or (10) and (11).
More generally, since the above strategy yields a block
error rate PEe > 1 − e−mε where ε is a characteristic of
the channel that depends on n, and we have p¯E = p1 ≤
e−mε even when the error-free data is used asKg without
additional privacy distillation. Using lemma 2, we have
also I(Kg;Y Enm|K) ≤ m(n−ε). To summarize, using also
lemma 3 we have
Theorem 1:
Under condition (9), unconditionally secure protocols
may be obtained via error correction coding but without
further privacy distillation that satisfy
p¯1 ≤ e−mε, I(Xn;Y Enm|K) ≤ m(n−ε), Ct ≥ (2mε+1)/2.
(12)
where ε > 0 is determined from the channel specification.
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Note that a net key Kg can be taken as Xn or its pri-
vacy distilled version with I(Kg;Y EnmK)→ 0 guaranteed
from (12) only when |K| < ε. On the other hand, the
security level (12) itself may be satisfactory already. We
use the phrase ‘unconditional security’ above in the usual
sense, except that the security level is measured by p¯E
and Ct rather than IE . This represents a more efficient
approach because, as we have seen in III.C, a bound on
p¯E has to be imposed in any case.
E. Specific Detection or Coding Scheme
As in all the unconditional security proofs of QKG pro-
tocols so far presented in the literature, the above devel-
opment can only yield an existence proof of a secure pro-
tocol, because no specific code has been given. For actual
application, one would need to provide a specific coding
or signaling scheme, in either classical or quantum key
generation, and show quantitatively that Eve has little
knowledge onKg. While I(Kg;Y En ), to be supplemented
by E’s side information, is a measure on E’s information,
it is not the most useful quantity to deal with as we have
already seen above because E cannot encode. Indeed, as
discussed in III.C, it is her error profile on Kg obtained
from Y En , not just I(K
g;Y En ), that really matters. The
appropriate measure to this end is her optimum block er-
ror probability P¯Ee (Xn|Y En ,K) given her observation and
side information. For advantage creation, one wants to
obtain the situation where
P¯Ee (Xn|Y En ,K)→ 1, PBe (Xn|Y Bn )→ 0. (13)
Condition (13) is equivalent to the above coding-theoretic
existence result when one argues, as in (9), by coding
on the n-bit symbols. In actual application, it may well
occur that the users work with only a single n-bit symbol
at a time, especially that already corresponds to n-bit
coding. In such case, (3) or (9) can be ignored and (13) is
the appropriate condition for advantage creation. Similar
to Theorem 1, we obtain via Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Theorem 2:
For a detection scheme that has P¯Ee (Xn|Y En ,K) >
1− 2−l while PBe (Xn|Y En ) is error-free in the use, an un-
conditionally secure protocol for the following fixed secu-
rity level is obtained without further privacy distillation
and with a key cost |K|,
p¯E ≤ 2−l, I(Xn;Y En |K) ≤ n− l, Ct ≥ (2l + 1)/2. (14)
Note that Theorem 2 is valid for a single use of the
block detection scheme without further coding. As in
Theorem 1, the scheme is certainly useful whenever |K| <
l if the resulting security level is satisfactory. To decrease
I(Kg;Y En K), further privacy distillation may be needed,
while no guarantee is offered in the theorem that a net
key with IE → 0 can be obtained that is larger than
|K|. However, in an appropriately designed scheme, it
may already happen that I(Xn;Y
E
n K)→ 0 with a secure
error profile without further privacy distillation. In such
a case, the following bit-error rate condition holds with
independent bit errors,
PEb (X |Y E ,K)→
1
2
, PBb (X |Y B)→ 0. (15)
See section VI for an example of a specific protocol
that displays such behavior under rather general attacks.
Condition (15) implies (13), and can be taken as the ad-
vantage creation condition at the bit level that requires
no further privacy distillation for generating Kg.
Observe that in the security proof of a specific detec-
tion/coding scheme, one must be careful to ascertain E’s
optimum block error by including her adaptive attacks, in
particular ones via attacks on the key. Also, for a full se-
curity proof one needs to solve the novel quantum detec-
tion problem in which one chooses the optimum quantum
measurement in anticipation of making a future decision
on the basis of further information not available at the
time of quantum measurement. However, such problems
also occur in the usual QKG protocols even in the con-
text of individual attacks, whenever a specific scheme is
employed rather than a mere coding-theoretic existence
claim. They have yet to be dealt with in the literature.
F. Key Verification
A final key verification process is needed in KCQ pro-
tocols as compared to BB84. In this case, A or B uses
the generated key kg to encrypt a fixed shared secret bit
sequence K ′v, which is perhaps the extended output of
a fixed known transformation on some separate shorter
shared secret key Kv, |Kv| ≤ |K ′v|, and sends it to the
other party through reliable communication. The en-
cryption mechanism for getting K ′v via K
g may be the
same as Fig.2 but used for direct encryption, thus no pri-
vacy distillation and key verification would be involved
there. It is also possible to reverse the above roles of Kv
and Kg in the verification, making it similar to a mes-
sage authentication protocol on Kg with a secret key Kv.
WhenKv is used as one-time pad to check an openly cho-
sen random unkeyed hashed version of Kg of size |Kv|,
the average probability that two different Kg are mis-
takenly agreed upon is 2−|Kv|. This results from a ran-
dom coding argument similar to the proof of the Shannon
Channel Coding Theorem or the privacy distillation code
performance theorem in Ref. [9]. The standard results
on hashing collision [3] can also be used instead. If the
users believe there is only a small number of errors in kg,
they may try to correct them via open discussion as in
some BB84 protocols, via parity check or other methods.
Given that a common key kg is generated between A
and B, it can be seen that E’s information cannot be more
than what she can get from one full copy of the quantum
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ciphertext, which may be granted to her for the purpose
of bounding her information. This is because whatever
probe she introduced that may mess up the state B re-
ceives, she cannot obtain more information than that of
a full copy although she may introduce enough errors to
makeKg agreement between A and B impossible. Such a
mess up, however, is not something A and B could avoid
in the presence of even a ‘passive’ attacker that takes en-
ergy out of the signal by tapping. Thus, there is no loss of
generality in not being able to establish a key in the pres-
ence of E, so long as the protocol is not sensitive as to be
discussed in section IV. Also, E cannot correlate her own
states and B’s states to obtain information, as she does
not knowK and what states to correlate with. The prob-
ability of such successful attack is small exponentially in
the number of bits n. Thus, perfect forward secrecy of
Kg with respect to K is obtained, while both intrusion
detection and intrusion-level detection are avoided.
G. Advantage Enhancement
Given that advantage can be created, it is possible to
enhance it, i.e., decreasing the attacker’s performance for
a fixed user performance, by various techniques. These
include first of all data bit randomization (DBR), the use
of a randomly chosen open or secret source code that
re-arranges the Ul in Fig. 2. Secondly, one may employ
deliberate error randomization (DER), the addition of er-
ror bits to B introduced deliberately by A with a corre-
sponding error correcting mechanism such as a CECC on
the quantum states. Thirdly, one may introduce chaining
among the data and keys, i.e., the use of local feedback to
make future transmissions dependent on past ones. Es-
pecially when used in conjunction, such techniques could
lead to a flattening of E’s error profile for any fixed n,
and hence her trial complexity Ct whether her entropy
H(Xn|Y En ,K) is affected or not.
In the classical situation where a fixed amount of
missing information represented by K˜m can be used to
uniquely specify the channel suffered by E as described in
III. B, all such techniques cannot produce H(Xn|Y En ,K)
more than H(K˜m) from lemma 1. Nevertheless, such
technique may still be useful in a given application be-
cause |K˜m|may be large or it may be difficult to ascertain
exactly. Furthermore, this is not the amount needed to
be provided as shared secrets between A and B. Quan-
tum mechanically, there is no K˜m that can restore the
data perfectly for E in a KCQ protocol. Thus, these
techniques could increase the key generation rate beyond
the original ∆I. In both the classical and quantum cases,
such possibility arises because the joint probability dis-
tribution of the random variables (XA, YB, YE) are not
specified a priori, but rather subject to the creation of
communication lines between (A, B) and (A, E) in a given
communication situation.
Another technique for enhancing the advantage may
be obtained as follows. Let 1 − λ be the fraction of sys-
tem splitted off by E and λ the one remaining for B.
This can be easily quantified in qumode system via the
signal energy, so that ηλ is the total fraction received by
B under the line transmittance η. Let pBηλ be the proba-
bility that A and B verify that their generated keys agree
with a fraction ηλ of the signal received by B, and pE1−λ
the probability that E correctly obtains the key with her
fraction 1− λ. The strategy of granting E a copy of the
quantum signal to bound her information is equivalent to
the condition that E’s probability of successful cheating
psE , p
s
E = p
B
η · pE1 , is small when A and B proceeds as if
E were not interrupting in a KCQ protocol described in
III. F. By making pBηλ small for λ ≤ λ0, a set threshold,
pSE is modified to
pSE = p
B
ηλ0 · pE1−λ0 . (16)
This represents advantage enhancement since (16) is
smaller than pBη · pE1 .
Two remarks on this technique are in order. First, un-
der the use of (16) which is a kind of pre-set automatic in-
trusion detection, the cryptosystem becomes more sensi-
tive and thus loses some of the robustness characteristics
of KCQ protocols. Second, this technique may be con-
sidered as one of advantage creation, because the user’s
performance may be correspondingly lowered with the
decrease of the attacker’s performance.
H. Overall KCQ Protocol
Schematically, a KCQ protocol corresponding to the
communication situation of Fig. 2 may be summarized
as follows.
Generic KCQ Protocol:
(i) A picks a random bit sequence Ul, encodes and
modulates the corresponding n qubits or n qumodes as
in Fig. 2, with a total secret key K = (Ks,Kc,Km,Kv)
shared with B.
(ii) From Km, advantage creation is achieved via the
different error performance obtainable by B and E who
does and does not knowKm at the time of their quantum
measurements.
(iii) Advantage enhancement and privacy distillation
may be achieved with appropriate system design, delib-
erate randomization and chaining techniques, so that a
substantial net key can be generated on which E has as
little information or as large an optimum error probabil-
ity as desired.
(iv) A and B verify that they agree on a common Kg
by using it with the secret key string Kv.
It is important to note the crucial role of the key ver-
ification process in the overall protocol. If E messed up
the state B receives, it produces no effect on the security
of the protocol if the key is verified because E cannot in
any case have more information on the correctly agreed
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key than what she can get from one full copy of the quan-
tum signal, exponentially probabilistically. If the system
is designed to be not sensitive to small disturbance, as
any practical system must be, it is perfectly fine that the
presence of E would disrupt the key generation process so
that the key is not verified. On the other hand, there are
problems in QKG protocols with intrusion-level detection
not to be elaborated on section IV.
We have explained the above steps that may enhance
the advantage and improve the efficiency and security of
the protocol. A full treatment of specific schemes will
be given in the following and in Part II. By combing the
analysis of sections II and III, we have
Theorem 3:
In the absence of channel noise, the protocol qk of Fig.
1 allows unconditionally secure key generation for any
fixed n-sequence with a security level given in the form
(12) without further privacy distillation.
Proof: We have seen in section II that E’s error prob-
ability is bounded away from zero for any n, while B’s
is exactly zero, and the key K is completely hidden with
the quantum ciphertext alone. Thus, the above generic
KCQ protocol would generate a fresh key. By coding as
in Theorem 1, the security level (12) is obtained where ε
depends on the encryption mechanism and the state ρkx.
Intuitively, one may expect that H(K|Xn, Y En ) would
remain substantial in qk even for large n, and also that
H(Xn|Y En ,K) is large. However, in the absence of either
a security proof against known-plaintext attack or a proof
that I(Xn;Y
E
n K)/n can be made sufficiently small, The-
orem 3 is not sufficient to guarantee a nonzero net key
generation rate that E knows essentially nothing about.
On the other hand, the bounds on P¯E and Ct should
be sufficient. A similar result would hold in the pres-
ence of channel noise, but a rigorous proof requires new
techniques to be presented in Part II.
More generally, secure protocols can be created by us-
ing quantum entanglement as follows. For each n-bit
data sequence x, let 2|K| mutually orthogonal states in
⊗ni=1Hi be the possible ρkx corresponding to different val-
ues of K, |K| < n. Each individual state space Hi may
be of any dimension. There exist many such modulation
formats where the resulting ρx =
∑
k ρ
k
x are not mutually
orthogonal for different x. We have
Theorem 4:
In the absence of channel noise, a KCQ protocol em-
ploying the above state modulation allows uncondition-
ally secure key generation for any fixed n-sequence with
security level given by (12) without further privacy dis-
tillation.
Proof:
From Lemma 1, I(Xn;Yn|K) as obtained by opti-
mizing over all E’s possible quantum measurements is
bound by H(K)+ I(Xn;Yn), obtained by the same mea-
surement. From Holevo’s inequality [33], I(Xn;Yn) ≤
S(
∑
x pxρx) −
∑
x pxS(ρx). From the above modulation
format, S(
∑
x pxρx) < n while S(ρ) = |K| = H(K).
Thus, condition (3) is satisfied and unconditionally se-
cure protocols exists, via coding n-bit blocks described
in III.D, with a security level given by (12).
For both Theorems 3 and 4, the system could be useful
for any |K| < n while the |Kv| cost is negligible for large
m, but the net key generation rate is not guaranteed to
be nonzero if I(Kg;Y En ) has to be made extremely small.
Note that the possibility of security proof for QKG re-
lies on the claim that all the possible useful actions of E
have been exhausted. That this is true in any particular
protocol has to be ascertained carefully. We assert that
this is the case for KCQ protocols described in this sec-
tion and section VI, as long as the model is taken to be
a valid description of the real situation [82].
Note that although security against attacks on the key
is automatic in qk, it is not in a general KCQ system.
Even with key security on quantum ciphertext-only at-
tacks, one needs to consider situations where some knowl-
edge on the data x is obtained from a partial attack on
ρkx, and then an attack on the key k is launched with
such knowledge, and then on x again, etc. The system
is not fully secure unless the key is secure against such
‘statistical attack’. This problem also occurs in BB84
type QKG when the generated key Kg is used later for
direct encryption. Even for the one-time pad mode, a
known-plaintext attack can be launched to learn part of
Kg, and knowledge on the rest may be obtained by E
from this and her probe information. These problems
will be analyzed in detail in part II.
I. Unconditional Security and System
Implementation
Unconditional security (US) in QKG is usually taken
to mean security against all possible attacks allowed by
the laws of physics (and logic), at a level that can be
made arbitrarily close to perfect. In particular, it would
imply security against an attacker that has unlimited
computational power and hence can perform any ex-
haustive search. Unconditional security must therefore
be information-theoretic, not complexity-based, security.
The term has, lately, often been used in a weakened
sense, such as ‘unconditional security against individual
attacks’. As long as the security claim is precisely spelled
out, the terminology issue is secondary. Since the secu-
rity is only as good as the mathematical model being
valid at the time of system use, it is useful to consider
various different qualitative degrees of unconditional se-
curity, especially in commercial type applications. As a
matter of fact, the experimental development of QKG is
still struggling within the realm of individual attacks, the
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justification being that it is physically complex, and cur-
rently practically impossible, to launch more general at-
tacks. In this paper, various weaker claims of security are
also considered, especially for specific quantifiable proto-
cols.
In the presence of system imperfection including those
arising from the source, transmission line, and detector,
we separate out E’s disturbance and call the rest ‘chan-
nel noise’ and ‘channel loss’, as is common in communi-
cation theory. In a situation intended for cryptographic
applications, one first determines what this actual chan-
nel including all these imperfections is, as characterized
by the channel parameters in a canonical representation
with some confidence interval estimates on these param-
eters. To guarantee security, advantage creation is to be
obtained under the following Advantage Creation Prin-
ciple for unconditional security.
(US) Advantage Creation Principle:
All the noise and loss suffered by the users are assumed
absent to the attacker, except those arising from a fun-
damentally inescapable limit or introduced deliberately
by the user at the transmitter.
Generally, advantage creation is obtained from the dif-
ference between I(Xn, Y
B
n ), which includes all the chan-
nel disturbance not counting E’s for KCQ schemes and
which is obtained from ρAB after disturbance by E for
BB84 type schemes, and I(Xn;Y
E
n K) which includes all
the irremovable system disturbance to E. There should
be a sufficient margin between I(Xn;Y
B
n ) and R of (9) in
a coding based KCQ scheme so that the protocol is not
sensitive to small fluctuation in channel parameters and
small disturbance by E. Thus, it is evident that even if
one can in principle get R close to I(Xn;Y
B
n ), ∆I deter-
mines the levels of channel parameter fluctuation and E’s
disturbance that can be tolerated for an efficient protocol
(high Peff in Section IV). What counts as an irremov-
able disturbance to E is a matter of technology state and
reality constraints, as well as fundamental obstacles. For
unconditional security, such fundamental obstacles may
include the laws of physics, deliberate actions by A at
the transmitter, shared secret between A and B, as well
as facts of nature as we know them. Only these should
be included in the above US Advantage Creation Princi-
ple. For many applications, practical advantage creation
such as those obtained from security against individual
attacks, may be quite sufficient. Thus, in a weakened
form, one may modify the US Advantage Creation Prin-
ciple by imposing on E whatever constraint that may
seem reasonable in a given application.
IV. PERFORMANCE EFFICIENCY OF QKG
PROTOCOLS
The performance of a QKG or key generation scheme
for useful real-life application is gauged not only by its
security level, but also its efficiency in at least two senses
to be elaborated in the following. The security level is
most usefully measured in terms of E’s error profile on
the final key as averaged over the random parameters
of the system and minimized over E’s possible attacks.
Since there is generally a trade-off between security and
efficiency, raising the efficiency for a given security level
is equivalent to raising the security level for a given effi-
ciency. In addition, for a protocol to be useful the effi-
ciencies cannot be too low.
The first type of efficiency that should be considered is
protocol efficiency, denoted by Peff , which has not been
treated in the QKG literature. It can be defined as the
probability that the protocol is not aborted for a given
channel and a fixed security level in the absence of an
attacker E. It is essential to consider the robustness of
Peff with respect to channel parameter fluctuation, e.g.,
how sensitive Peff is to small changes in channel param-
eter λc which may denote, e.g., the independent qubit
noise rate of any kind. In practice, λc is known only
approximately for a variety of reasons, and imperfection
in the system can never be entirely eliminated. If Peff
is sensitive to such small changes, the protocol may be
practically useless as it may be aborted almost all the
time. Sensitivity issues are crucial in engineering design,
and there are examples of ‘supersensitive’ ideal system
whose performance drops dramatically in the presence of
small imperfection. Classical examples include detection
in nonwhite Gaussian noise [34] and image resolution be-
yond the diffraction limit [35]. Superposition of ‘macro-
scopic’ quantum states is supersensitive to loss [36]. This
crucial sensitivity issue is one of fundamental principle,
not mere state of technology. It has thus far received
little attention in the field of quantum information.
As will be shown in sections V–VII, our qumode KCQ
key generation protocols are robust to channel parameter
fluctuations. On the other hand, the Lo-Chau protocol
[37] is supersensitive at high security level. This is be-
cause any amount of residue noise in the system would
be mistaken as E’s action in the parity-check hashing,
and the protocol would be aborted according to its pre-
scription. The situation is particularly severe in view
of our discussion in III.C concerning E’s ability to use
her information. The reverse reconciliation protocol in
Ref. [38], which supposedly can operate in any loss, is
supersensitive in high loss. Let η be the transmittance
so that η ≪ 1 corresponds to the high loss situation.
In the presence of a small additive noise of η/2 photons
in the system, the protocol becomes completely useless
because the noise induced by the attacker cannot be dis-
tinguished from excess noise. Apparently, the modified
Lo-Chau or Shor-Preskill type protocols can be operated
without such supersensitivity. Note that high security
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level often decreases Peff and it is important to quantify
the tradeoff.
Even when the scheme is not supersensitive, the sen-
sitivity level has to quantified in a QKG scheme involv-
ing intrusion-level detection for a complete protocol with
quantifiable security, for the following reason that has not
been discussed in the literature. The security proofs of
such a scheme always has a conclusion of the following
form: If E has information IEi > δ on K
g from any at-
tack ai, then the probability that ai would pass the test
is PEi < 1 − ǫδ for small δ and ǫδ. This may be put in
form of a conditional probability statement
P (pass|IEi > δ) < 1− ǫδ. (17)
However, the reverse conditional probability statement is
required for a real security proof:
P (IEi > δ|pass) < 1− ǫδ. (18)
It is easy to see that P (IEi > δ|pass) can be large under
(17), say if E keeps attacking with ai that yields signif-
icant IEi . For example, in standard BB84, E can learn
each bit with probability ∼ 0.85 in an opaque attack.
This shows that the users must employ a ‘stopping strat-
egy’ in a complete protocol, by adopting a stopping rule
which stops the whole process after a number of test re-
sults that lead to aborting the protocol, and another rule
to re-start the process. To evaluate (18), one would need
P (pass) in addition to (17) which would involve in turn
P (pass|IEi < δ). (19)
This probability (19) depends on the quantitative sensi-
tivity level just discussed, corresponding to the case of
no attack or IEi = 0. In addition, E’s optimal attack
on the sequence of key generation trials depends on the
user’s stopping and re-starting strategy, and it appears
one cannot bound the overall I(IE > δ|pass) before such
a strategy is spelled out. It should be clear that much
remains to be done to obtain quantitative results on the
overall protocol security and efficiency. In this connec-
tion, it may also be observed that in all security proofs
involving the use of an error correcting code, it was not
shown that an efficient (non-exponential) decoding al-
gorithm exists. Thus, on many levels it has not been
demonstrated that an efficient protocol exists with quan-
tifiable security levels even for standard BB84. On the
other hand, these problems do not arise in specific KCQ
schemes.
After the protocol goes forward, there is clearly the
question of key-bit generation efficiency (or rate) kgeff
which may be defined via the number of generated key
bits subtracted by the number of key bits used in the
protocol, i.e., Kgeff ≡ (|Kg − |K|)/n when an n-bit data
sequence was used to obtain Kg with a total key K =
(Ks,Kc,Km,Kv) that is not re-used. This should be
distinguished from the final effective key generation rate
kgr , which includes all the operations in the protocol to
give the actual speed of key generation, a subject not
discussed in this paper. When the modulation key Ki
with |Ki| = |Km| is not re-used in the coded system of
section III.4 in an m-block of n-bit symbols,
kgeff = R − |Km|/n− IE/n− |Kv|/mn, (20)
where IE is E’s information rate that needs to be elim-
inated. If the protocol is secure under known-plaintext
attacks, the |Km| term can be omitted. The IE term
may be omitted if the coding scheme automatically forces
I(Xn;Y
E
n K) to be negligible.
V. KCQ COHERENT-STATE KEY
GENERATION WITH BINARY DETECTION
In this section we describe the use of KCQ on qumodes,
quantum modes with infinite-dimensional Hilbert state
spaces, for key generation via coherent states of interme-
diate or large energy. In most of the current experimental
developments [2, 38] of QKG, coherent states are em-
ployed in BB84 type protocols that are limited in energy
to ∼ 0.1 photon, if only because of the photon-number
splitting attack that E can launch near the transmitter
[39, 40]. With KCQ, we will in this and the next section
show that much larger energy can be employed, line am-
plifiers and pre-amplifiers can be used, and conventional
optical technology on the sources, modulators, and de-
tectors can be utilized. Furthermore, direct encryption
coherent-state KCQ in what is called the αη scheme has
already been experimentally observed [17, 18], which will
integrate smoothly with the corresponding key genera-
tion schemes that are currently under experimental de-
velopment.
A. αη and its Extensions
The usual description of a single coherent state already
involves an infinite dimensional space, referred to as a
qumode. Similar to the qubit case in Fig. 1, we may
considerM possible coherent states |αl〉 in a single-mode
realization,
αl = α0(cos θl + i sin θl), θl =
2πl
M
, l ∈ {1, ...,M ],
(21)
where α20 is the energy (photon number) in the state,
and 2pilM is the angle between two neighboring states. In
a two-mode realization, the states are products of two
coherent states
|α0 cos θl〉1|α0 sin θl〉2 , θi = 2πl
M
, l ∈ {1, ...,M},
(22)
The qumodes may be those associated with polarization,
time, frequency, or any type of classical mode. Any
two basis states form a phase reversal keying (antipo-
dal) signal set, which are nearly orthogonal for α0 ≥ 3.
The optimal quantum phase measurement [41] yields a
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root-mean-square phase error ∆θ ∼ 1/α0. Thus, when
M ≫ α0, the probability of error PEb ∼ 1/2 when the ba-
sis is not known which has been confirmed numerically
[13], while PBb ∼ exp(−α20)→ 0 when the basis is known.
This scheme can be used for key generation as follows.
An attacker not knowing the key K has to make a mea-
surement to cover all possible angles for different possi-
ble K ′ in her effort to pin down the data X . From such
measurement result, she can then try to determine all the
possible x corresponding to the different possible k′. For
each running key k′ from her trial key k that selects a par-
ticular basis for a particular bit, E has a classical binary
decision problem for two, not m, possible signal points.
The more practical heterodyne measurement, which may
be forced on the attacker with a signal set of varying
amplitudes in addition to the varying phase of αη, is 6
dB worse in energy than the optimal measurement [10].
The optimal phase measurement, which has no known
physical realization, is worse than the optimal quantum
measurement of antipodal signals by ∼ 3 dB in signal
energy A detailed binary-decision numerical evaluation
on this performance is under way, but the 3 dB estimate
follows from the amplitude/phase and conjugate quadra-
tures (heterodyne/homodyne) analogy, and is supported
by known results [42]. In any event, the precise number
is important in an actual design of real system and in
bringing out the intrinsic limitation of the system, but is
not as important for illustrating the possibility and ba-
sic principle involved. In this case, the principle is that
there is a substantial difference in performance due to a
quantum effect that has no classical analog, viz, differ-
ent incompatible quantum measurements versus a single
complete measurement in the classical case.
More precisely, for discrimination of two equally likely
coherent states {|α0〉, | − α0〉}, the optimum quantum
receiver yields an error rate P¯b that may be compared to
the heterodyne result P hetb and the phase measurement
result P phb , with S = α
2
0,
P¯b =
1
4
e−4S, P hetb ∼
1
2
e−S, P phb ∼
1
2
e−2S (23)
Here, S measures the average number of photons received
in the detector and (23) applies in the so-called quantum-
limited detection regime— unity detector quantum effi-
ciency, infinite detector bandwith, all device noise sup-
pressed. Under (23) and dropping the factors in front of
the exponentials for a numerical estimate of the bit-error
rate (BER), which is required to be ≤ 10−9 per use in a
typical communication application, we have, for a meso-
scopic level S ∼ 10, P¯b ∼ 10−12, P hetb ∼ 10−3, P phb ∼
10−6. If the data arrives at a rate of 1 Gbps, the user B
is likely to have 109 error-free bits in 1 sec, while E would
have ∼ 103 errors among her 109 bits with the optimum
phase measurement. By the usual privacy distillation ap-
proach [9], the users can generate∼ 103 secure key bits by
eliminating E’s information. Thus, in principle, αη in its
original form is capable of secure key generation against
individual attacks that employs the optimal phase mea-
surement on each qumode. Similar to all cases of specific
QKG schemes to date, that there is no full security proof
against even constant individual attacks in contrast to
the claim of unconditional security in existence proofs,
the above analysis does not prove there is no other indi-
vidual or collective measurement, particularly adaptive
ones utilizing the seed key information, that would yield
a substantially better BER for E than the optimal phase
measurement. Intuitively, we feel that is quite unlikely,
but new techniques in classical and quantum detection
theory are being developed to give precise quantitative
treatment on such problems. Note that whatever the fi-
nal result may turn out to be, it only affects the quantita-
tive advantage level but not the possibility of advantage
creation. In this connection, we may mention that αη in
its original form was proposed for key generation in Ref.
[43], with no consideration of information-theoretic key
security against meaningful attacks. In the way αη was
run, actually no fresh key can be generated because P hetb
in (23) is very small.
More serious limitations on the use of αη for key gen-
eration, I believe, arise from the US Advantage Creation
Principle when the above scheme is to be utilized in prac-
tice. In the first place, device thermal noise is signif-
icant at high data rate and small signals, thus optical
pre-amplifiers need to be used. For the usual erbium
amplifier this would already take out the advantage over
E. On this issue, it may be pointed out that the optimum
binary quantum receiver has not been implemented so far
in αη, but the near-optimum Kennedy receiver [44], with
P ′b = (1/2)e
−4S is currently under development. (The
factor 1/2 difference between P¯b and P
′
b can be recovered
in a Dolinar receiver described in Ref. [45], which is the
first systematic investigation of optical receiver perfor-
mance improvement via feedback.) On the other hand,
the photon number amplifier (PNA) [39, 46] could lead
to an ideal Kennedy receiver in principle although PNA
is far from practical at present. Secondly, in the presence
of a line loss η from A to B, one would need to compare
PBb ∼ e−4ηS to PEb ∼ e−2S according to the Advantage
Creation Principle when E attacks near A. Even if one
uses the advantage creation technique of accounting for
E’s energy splitting described in III.G, and the postde-
tection selection technique of Ref. [7], in conjunction it
appears difficult to create an advantage over E that would
allow key generation over truly long-distance telecomm
fibers. Thus, a more powerful approach via m-ary detec-
tion is developed in the following. Before we turn to this
advantage creation technique, it is useful to introduce a
number of other techniques that may improve the secu-
rity and efficiency of KCQ schemes, and to demonstrate
a general limitation on the binary detection approach to
coherent-state KCQ for key generation.
It is important to note that αη represents a new type
of cipher even when it is operated in a completely classi-
cal setting, and even in the absence of any channel noise.
This is because deliberate randomization may be intro-
duced by A in many ways. Consider the situation where
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the circle of Fig.1 represents a classical two-dimensional
signal space, say corresponding to the two quadratures of
a single frequency. In the absence of any noise, the circle
would represent the different possible phase-shifted sig-
nals of a given energy. Thus, the cryptosystem can be
run in the same way as αη with or without classical noise,
in hardware and even in software. Indeed, in the direct
encryption experiments on αη reported thus far [18, 29],
the performance obtained via the coherent-state quan-
tum noise can also be achieved by high-speed deliberate
partial randomization of the signals by A corresponding
to the coherent-state noise effect. When αη is used for
key generation, one may employ the technique of delib-
erate signal randomization (DSR) for which each signal
state at the output of the encryption box of Fig. 1 is
further randomized so that it is uniformly distributed on
the semi-circle centered at the state chosen by the run-
ning key K ′. Similar to the qubit case, one may readily
show the intuitively obvious fact that the key K is com-
pletely hidden form E who does not knowK and X , even
if she possesses one copy of ρkx corresponding to an arbi-
trarily long data sequence x. The general interwined case
described in section III will be treated in Part II, as it in-
volves security against known-plaintext attack on direct
encryption. This is true classically also as just discussed.
In the presence of quantum or classical noise, one needs
to use a proper randomization if all the error control is
built in the antipodal signal set only, as above. When a
CECC is used on top of the antipodal signals, delibera-
tion error randomization can be introduced to improve
security/efficiency as described in section III.G.
In addition to providing complete protection against
ciphertext-only attack on the key, DSR also improves the
efficiency of key generation. If the state is rotated by an
angle θ away from the one set by K ′ and is unknown to
the detector which knows K ′, the optimum phase mea-
surement BER as a function of θ is yet to be evaluated,
but the corresponding Kennedy and heterodyne receiver
performance are
P¯b(θ) ∼ e
−2S cos2 θ
(1−cos)2 , P hetb (θ) ∼
1
2
e−S cos
2 θ. (24)
The P¯b(θ) in (24) is the Chernov bound [47] for the
Kennedy receiver when cos θ ≪ 1, while P hetb (θ) is the
usual upper bound on Gaussian errors [4]. It is expected
that in a more exact evaluation of P¯b(θ), the energy ad-
vantage is closer to the original 6 dB than the 3 dB one of
(24), and similarly for P phb (θ). Thus, even for large signal
energy, A can control the BER to B and E and causes
more errors to E through B’s advantage. In practice,
some CECC should be used for reliable system operation,
and channel code key Kc, chaining, and other techniques
could be used to enhance the advantage already created
for efficiency improvement.
With DSR on αη, one may obtain secure key genera-
tion against constant individual attacks as follows. Let
the angle θ be randomized so that it appears uniform over
the whole circle with respect to E’s optimum (phase) con-
stant qumode measurement. In this way, the key K is
completely hidden even in a known-plaintext attack, in a
way exactly similar to the classical noiseless case where a
semicircle is sufficient to protect against ciphertext-only
attacks. If the signal strength S is not large enough, this
would also introduce error to B. However, a CECC can
be designed to correct only up to the BER B then suffers,
which is smaller than that of E due to B’s error perfor-
mance advantage. By using Theorem 1, one may gener-
ate fresh keys, with no cost for each n-bit symbol due to
security against known-plaintext attacks. We summarize
Theorem 5:
With proper use of DSR just described, a coded αη
scheme leads to unconditionally secure net key gener-
ation against constant individual attacks with security
level given by (12).
Again, with the development of proper bounding tech-
niques, we believe the restriction to constant individual
attacks in Theorem 5 can be simply removed. The de-
tailed quantitative dependence of the security level as a
function of S and other system parameters will be given
for both individual and joint attacks in the future.
B. Binary Detection KCQ Key Generation
For binary coherent-state signals, the optimal quan-
tum receiver performance cannot be better than that of
heterodyne by 6 dB in energy or error exponent. This is
a known fact among all the usual binary coherent state
systems, but there is no general proof in the literature.
A proof can be supplied, which is not difficult, but is
omitted here for brevity. Also, it may be proved that
antipodal signals lead to optimal BER under energy con-
straint on coherent states. Furthermore, it is not possible
to increase the error advantage by utilizing bandwidth, or
more generally any multimode system, for the following
reason.
Consider an optical quantum field of arbitrary band-
width E(x, t) where x is the transverse spatial dimension.
On her copy of the field, whether it is the one she split-
ted off by tapping or the hypothetical one we grant her
for bounding her information, she can always in principle
make a heterodyne measurement to obtain the classical
readout ε(x, t), which is described by [48],
ε(x, t) = εs(x, t) + n(x, t), (25)
where εs(x, t) is the amplitude of the coherent-state sig-
nal and n(x, t) is an additive Gaussian noise in t with
spectral density hf at frequency f . All quantum fluctua-
tion in every space-time mode has already been included.
In a binary detection system involving two classical sig-
nals in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), one can
always extract one signal dimension (one quadrature out
of one mode) that contains all the information for optimal
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discrimination [47]. The whiteness approximation that
all f ∼ f0, a single frequency, is very good for all practi-
cal optical signals. Thus, even though (25) contains many
quantum noise photons– one from every mode– in the op-
timal receiver only one such mode is to be extracted by
appropriate spatial-temporal filtering. As a consequence,
we are back to the single-mode situation where there is
just one noise photon from heterodyne. Indeed, hetero-
dyne is a ‘universal’ measurement whose result captures
all aspects of the field mode: amplitude, phase, quadra-
tures, etc., that allows E to try all possible K to identify
all possible data. One may understand this result from
the important fact that a multimode coherent-state ex-
cited field from vacuum is equivalent to a single-mode
coherent-state excited field.
The result just quoted is not true for nonclassical light,
i.e., optical fields in quantum states that is not classical,
not a coherent state or a classically random superposition
of coherent states. Clearly, there can be huge improve-
ment between the optimal and heterodyne detection of
a nonclassical state. For number states, ideal photon
counting yields Pb = 0 for on-off signals. For squeezed
states, homodyne detection along the maximum squeez-
ing direction sees the minimum noise as compared to one
that may see a large noise without knowledge of that
direction. Thus, by using K to determine such direc-
tions, the users would obtain huge error advantage over
E even in a binary detection system. One can similarly
use number states and other orthogonal states in conjunc-
tion with coherent states to create other binary systems
that give arbitrarily small BER for B but large ones for
E.
We would not go into the details for such development
because intermediate or large-energy nonclassical states
do not have much practical significance as data source in
long-distance communication [13]. This is because the in-
evitable system imperfection, especially linear loss, would
quickly transform such nonclassical states into classical
ones. As a consequence, the initial energy or error ad-
vantage disappears quickly over a lossy communication
line. For realistic application of mesoscopic or macro-
scopic energy signals, we may want to limit ourselves to
coherent states.
VI. KCQ COHERENT-STATE KEY
GENERATION WITH m-ARY DETECTION
The above limitation on the binary detection advan-
tage of an optimal quantum receiver versus heterodyne
can be overcome in m-ary detection. The use of m-ary
systems, in fact, is one form of coding. As will be seen
in the following, it indeed corresponds to driving the sys-
tem at a rate between B’s and E’s mutual information
with respect to A as in (9). Amazingly, for the particu-
lar CPPM system we now turn, such a rate choice by A
automatically makes IE go to zero with a flat error pro-
file, with also full information-theoretic security against
known plaintext attack on the key. This is proved against
the universal heterodyne attack, and is likely to be true
against all possible attacks. Thus, not only the data en-
joy unconditional security at the near perfect level, the
key has security that has never even been suggested pos-
sible before in either standard or quantum cryptography.
A. CPPM— Coherent Pulse Position Modulation
An m-ary coherent-state pulse position modulation
system has the following signal set for m possible mes-
sages,
|φi〉 = |0〉1 · · · |α0〉i · · · |0〉m, i ∈ {1, ...,m}. (26)
In (26), each |φi〉 is in m qumodes all of which are in the
vacuum state except the ith mode, which is in a coherent
state |α0〉i. The corresponding classical signals are or-
thogonal pulse position modulated if each mode is from
a different time segment, but generally the modes can
be of any type. For brevity, we retain the term ‘pulse
position’ even through ‘general mode position’ is more
appropriate.
The photon counting as well as heterodyne error per-
formance of (26) are well known [20]. The block error rate
from direct detection is exponential optimum for largem.
P dire = (1 −
1
m
)e−S, P¯e → e−S . (27)
The optimum block error rate P¯e for (26) is known ex-
actly [11], and given in (27) asymptotically. In contrast,
for large m the heterodyne block error rate P hete ap-
proaches 1 exponentially in n = log2m, which is a general
consequence of the Strong Converse to the Channel Cod-
ing Theorem as discussed in section III.D. For the present
Gausssian channel case for heterodyne receivers, explicit
lower bound on the block error rate P hete , conditioned on
any transmitted i, can be obtained in the form (p382 of
[31])
P hete > (1 − [Φ(y)]n)Φ(y −
√
2S), (28)
where Φ is the normalized Gaussian distribution. By
choosing y >
√
2n, (28) yields explicitly P hete → 1 expo-
nentially in n for any given S. It is a main characteristic
of classical orthogonal or simplex signals in AWGN that
whenever an error is made, it is equally likely to be de-
coded by the optimal receiver to any of the m− 1 other
messages. Thus, under the condition P hete → 1, the error
profile is uniform, viz, pi = 1/m or the BER Pb = 1/2
with independent errors.
The KCQ qumode key generation scheme CPPMworks
as follows. Consider m = 2n possible n-bit sequences,
and possible coherent-states
|ψi〉 = ⊗mj=1|αij〉′j , i, j ∈ {1, ...,m} (29)
in correspondence with {|φi〉} of (26). For simplicity,
one may set
∑
j |αij |2 = |α0|2 = S for every i. Let fk
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be a one-to-one map between (26) and (29) indexed by
a key K. As an example of physical realization, the con-
nection between (26) and (29) could be through a set of
N beam-splitters with transmission coefficients
√
ηl for
complex numbers ηl, l ∈ {1, ..., N}, determined by k.
Such a physical realization combines the αij of (29) co-
herently through the ηl’s, and is represented by a unitary
transformation between the two m-tensor product state
spaces ⊗mi=1Hi and ⊗mi=1H ′i for the input and the output.
[83] The states |ψi〉 of (29) are used to modulate the data
i by A, and B demodulates by first applying fk to trans-
form it to |φi〉 of (26) and then use direct detection on
each of the m modes Hi.
Without knowing fk or ηl so that there are both am-
plitude and phase uncertainties for each l, it is expected
that an attacker can do very little better than heterodyne
on all the H ′i modes, which is equivalent to heterodyne on
all the Hi modes, and then apply the different fk’s on the
classical measurement result (25). As presented above,
by making m large one can then make not only p¯E = 2
−l
for any l but E’s error profile is in fact nearly uniform,
with pi = (1 − 2−l)/(m − 1) for i ≥ 2, thus no need for
further privacy distillation. As a consequence, the sys-
tem is not only completely secure against ciphertext-only
attack on the key but also fully secure against known-
plaintext attacks. This is because given an input-output
pair (Xn, Y
E
n ), the heterodyne output Y
E
n has no relation
to Xn for any k from E’s uniform error profile. The ex-
act quantitative behavior may be bounded via (28). We
summarize:
Theorem 6
Against E’s universal heterodyne attack, the m-ary
CPPM KCQ protocol is unconditionally secure with
asymptotic key generation rate n = log2m per use and
p¯E , IE going to zero exponentially in n.
The only easy way to remove the restriction to hetero-
dyning for E is to note that the optimum quantum re-
ceiver for discrimination among the states (26) is unique
[49]. Thus, there is a gap between it and the receiver per-
formance that does not know K at the time of quantum
measurement, which translates into a mutual information
statement (9) that can be used to show the existence of
codes upon further coding, as described in III.E, that
yields security in the sense of Theorem 1. Although this
does not seem to give useful practical protocol for actual
implementation and does not guarantee key bit genera-
tion, it is of interest in principle to record the following.
Theorem 7:
Against any attack by Eve, the CPPM scheme may
be further coded to provide unconditional security with
levels given by (12).
B. Further Outlook
The direct detection or optimal detection performance
(27) is affected by the presence of device noise so that
there is no more vacuum state in (26). However, or-
dinary pre-amplifier could be used that suppresses all
the device noise with a resulting performance degrada-
tion that amounts to a less factor 1/4 ≤ η < 1 in m-
ary PPM. Furthermore, in principle a photon-number
amplifier mentioned in VI.A can be used as a noiseless
pre-amplifier. Quantitative evaluations of the resulting
performance are, however, yet to be carried out. One
major advantage of coherent-state KCQ scheme is that
they can be used through a limited number of ampli-
fiers and switching nodes in a properly designed system
with appropriate amplifiers. In general, quantum am-
plifiers degrade the user’s error performance due to the
fundamental quantum noise they introduce [39]. In a
properly designed chain with appropriately chosen am-
plifier gains and lengths of lossy line segments, one can
obtain a linear [50] instead of an exponential degradation
in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as a function of total
line length. There is no need to decrypt and re-encrypt
at the input of an amplifier as in a repeater, as long as
the degradation introduced by the amplifier still leaves
B with performance advantage over E. Recall the overall
general Advantage Creation Principle for key generation
that B must have performance advantage on the decoded
information-bit sequence after all system imperfections
including loss and noise are taken into account,as com-
pared to E’s decoded information-bit sequence for no loss
and no imperfection other than unavoidable ones. In the
case of CPPM, B’s performance would be scaled by the
total transmittance η so that S is replaced by ηS in (27).
In principle, it is still a better performance compared to
(28) with η = 1 for large enough m. Thus, CPPM can be
secure for arbitrarily long-distance fiber communication.
It may be mentioned that the possible use of am-
plifier in a quantum cryptosystem has been intro-
duced previously for weak coherent states and hetero-
dyne/homodyne detection [51] that traces back to Ref.
[52] that describes both coherent-state and squeezed-
state cryptosystems. In particular, the usual-state
scheme in Ref. [51] employs conjugate-variable measure-
ment detection of intrusion level similar to the schemes of
Ref. [38], while also allowing a limited use of amplifiers
as described. However, all such schemes are inefficient
because weak or small energy signals have to be used to
avoid good performance in determining the actual sig-
nal state via optimal quantum detection by E, and via
attacks similar to the USD attack on coherent-state re-
alization of BB84 type systems [39, 40].
The CPPM scheme is also ideal for direct data encryp-
tion because it automatically produces a near uniform
error profile on E corresponding to near-perfect bit-by-
bit security. Indeed, from the constant inner product
〈φi|φj〉 for every i 6= j which is the quantum analog of
the classical orthogonal or simplex signal behavior that is
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responsible for their near uniform error profile in AWGN,
it would be possible to prove that such a property persists
under E’s optimal attack. It would then appear that all
problems are solved in principle as arbitrarily large error
exponent advantage can be obtained between (27) and
(28) by making m large.
Unfortunately, as in a classical orthogonal signaling
scheme, large m in CPPM means exponential growth
of bandwidth, not to mention growth in physical com-
plexity. Indeed, (27) itself is an infinite-bandwidth re-
sult for large m. One the other hand, it is known [13]
that if the signal-to-quantum noise per unit bandwidth
is small, coherent-state direct detection systems do have
larger capacity than heterodyne ones. Thus, it may be
expected that properly designed error correcting codes,
usually employed for bandlimited systems for such rea-
sons, could be developed to retain much of the CPPM
advantage for a large given bandwidth.
VII. KCQ AND DIRECT ENCRYPTION
For direct encryption, one needs to consider ciphertext-
only attack on the key, on the data, and known-plaintext
attack on the key. In conventional cryptography one has
the Shannon bound, H(X |Y ) ≤ H(K), on the condi-
tional entropy of the data X given the ciphertext Y via
the key entropy. In the quantum case or in the pres-
ence of irreducible classical noise to E, the corresponding
bound
H(X |YE) ≤ H(K) (30)
is no longer valid where YE is the classical ciphertext
available to E. In the quantum case, YE is obtained via
a quantum measurement. If (30) is valid as is the case
in conventional cryptography, it does not mean that E
knows all the bits in X except for |K| of them. That
would be disastrous as it often happens that |K| ≤ 103
while |X | > 109. The operational meaning of (30) has
never been analyzed in conventional cryptography, to my
knowledge. It is usually not considered a problem be-
cause it is presumed that E would get many information
bits in X wrong knowing only Y and not K. However,
a more detailed analysis is needed for a security proof
with respect to whatever chosen criteria, as we have done
for key generation in section III.C. But that has never
been provided in conventional cryptography other than
the trivial one-time pad case. When (30) is violated,
Lemma 1 implies I(X ;YEK) < H(X), a condition that
allows key generation via (3) as in Theorem 1. For direct
encryption, such violation has the important implication
that very high level of data-bit security may be obtained
without using the inefficient one-time pad. Indeed, we
have seen how this may occur in CPPM treated in sec-
tion VI. Note that Theorems 1 and 2 can also be used to
describe the data quality in direct encryption.
It is easy to protect K from ciphertext-only joint at-
tacks in αη with the use of, e.g., DSR, discussed in section
V.A. The technique can be extended to cover known-
plaintext attacks in two different ways, to be presented
in Part II. Without DSR, the bound (30) obtains with
H(K)/ logM on the right-hand side. The usual security
problem is known-plaintext attack, in which E tries to
determine K from data-output sequence pairs with sta-
tistical correlation information on the data (of varying
degree). Security against known-plaintext attacks is al-
ways at best computational complexity-based against ex-
ponential search in conventional cryptography. For noisy
system, we suggest that it is possible to have information-
theoretic security, i.e.,
H(K|X,YE) > 0, H(K|X,YB) = 0, (31)
which has never been suggested before and is clearly im-
possible in conventional cryptography where YE = YB.
Full security would correspond to H(K|X,YE) = H(K),
which again can be closely approximated in CPPM sys-
tems, at least for the universal heterodyne attack.
Even when H(K|X,YE) = 0 as is the case in conven-
tional cryptography for sufficiently long X , the system
may be secure in the sense of high search complexity. In
particular, αη in the original form without DSR provides
an additional search problem to E, as compared to just
the encryption box, that is exponential in |K|/ log2M ,
at least for brute-force search. For increasing the search
complexity, one may make sure the input data can never
be perfectly known in several ways. One is to use polar-
ity or padding bits as described in Section II. Another
is to generate the polarity bits through a running key
obtained from another encryption mechanism with the
same K or another different key as the seed key. Note
that the proper use of DSR would introduce inevitable
coherent-state quantum noise for E, which may even lead
to information-theoretic security already if the energy in
the coherent state is not too large. No proof of any cryp-
tosystem has ever been given in conventional cryptog-
raphy, to my knowledge, that establishes rigorous ex-
ponential lower bound on the search complexity. And
we have not (yet) succeeded in proving that αη necessi-
tates an exponential search either - it is just an added
search burden as compared to just the encryption box
and appears exponential. In general, such multi-variable
correlated classical statistical problem has the full math-
ematical complexity of many-body problems and quan-
tum field theory in physics. Useful lower bound is also
notoriously difficult to obtain in computation problems.
Perhaps these explain why no rigorous security proof is
available on such complexity-based security.
On the other hand, exponential search complexity
should be good enough for any application. We have
mentioned in section II that Grover’s search only reduces
the exponent by a factor of two, which is easily compen-
sated by increasing the key size by a factor of two in
many standard schemes as well as in our KCQ schemes,
either qubit or coherent-state.
As noted previously in this paper, data security against
attacks on the key with statistical knowledge on data
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that are not completely random is required for a com-
plete proof of key generation security with KCQ. An ex-
tensive general theoretical development of direct encryp-
tion security analysis will be provided in Part II, where
conditional probabilities will be used in addition to en-
tropies for more precise quantitative estimate of specific
coding/detection scheme performance. The behaviors of
αη, CPPM, and their refinement and extension will be
developed for concrete cryptosystem design.
VIII. COMPARISON AMONG QKG SCHEMES
We present below a brief qualitative comparison be-
tween QKG schemes of the BB84 type, of the qubit KCQ
type, and the coherent-state KCQ type. Detailed quanti-
tative comparisons will be given after rigorous evaluation
of the quantitative characteristics of these schemes for fi-
nite n.
Theoretically, BB84 type protocols suffer from the fol-
lowing classes of problems as a matter of fundamental
principle.
(i) It is hard to bound Eve’s error rate on the key gen-
erated due to the difficulties of intrusion-level estimation
under joint attacks with side information on the error
correcting and privacy distillation codes.
(ii) It is difficult to produce a complete protocol that
can be practically implemented with quantifiable secu-
rity and efficiency, due to the decoding problem and the
stopping-rule problem.
(iii) It is hard to include the various system imper-
fections in an unconditional security proof, and to build
protocols robust with respect to fluctuations in the mag-
nitude of these imperfections.
(iv) The necessary use of weak signals and the diffi-
culty of repeating the signal without decryption imply
low throughput even with just moderate loss.
(v) The intrinsic small quantum effect of a single pho-
ton necessitates an accurate sensitivity analysis with re-
spect to the system imperfection and environmental per-
turbations, that would result in a low interference toler-
ance threshold in commercial applications.
Corresponding to these problems are related practical
one including
(i′) It is difficult or impossible to rigorously ascertain
the quantitative security level of the generated key.
(ii′) The throughput or key-generation rate would be
low, especially in the presence of substantial loss.
(iii′) The cryptosystem is sensitive to interference, and
needs to be controlled and checked with a high precision
difficult to achieve practically.
(iv′) High-precision components corresponding to a
fundamentally new technology are required, including the
source, transmission line or repeater, and detector.
With the exception of (i) and (ii), which are further dis-
cussed in Appendix A, all these problems are evident and
well known in BB84 although there are disagreements on
how readily they can be overcome. Nevertheless, in the
foreseeable future it seems clear that BB84 type schemes
cannot be made to operate in a commercial type environ-
ment with any reasonable level of security and efficiency
for even moderately long distance. The weak coherent-
state schemes of Ref. [38] also suffer from all these prob-
lems except (iv′), and that of Ref. [51] is only slightly
better.
With the use of qubit KCQ type schemes, the theo-
retical problems in (i) and (ii) can be largely overcome,
but not the ones in (iii) and (iv) except perhaps with
very low key-bit generation efficiency. Except for (i′),
the practical difficulties (ii′)-(iv′) also remain. Again, it
may be possible to alleviate these problems with strong
error correction that implies a low kgeff .
With the use of the qumode KCQ schemes of inter-
mediate to large energy, all the fundamental difficulties
(i)-(iv) can be substantially reduced. Furthermore, each
of the practical difficulties (i′)-(iv′) either disappears or
is substantially alleviated. The exception is loss in long-
distance fiber communication. In principle, a wideband
coherent CPPM system presented in section VI could
solve all problems. For practical application, new ap-
proaches are needed to deal with bandwidth limitation
and coherence requirements. It is still a major problem to
create enough advantage for unconditional information-
theoretic security.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A new principle of quantum cryptography has been
presented on the basis of optimal versus nonoptimal
quantum detection when a seed key is known or not
known. This possibility of yielding better performance
for the users over an attacker is a quantum effect with
no classical analog. In classical physics, a complete ob-
servation of the physical signal state can be made with
or without the key. It would be misleading to phrase
the basis of this possibility as no-cloning, which is triv-
ially covered [53, 54] by quantum detection theory that
provides detailed quantitative limits on quantum state
discrimination from the laws of quantum physics. A de-
tailed development of the appropriate novel quantum de-
tection theory wil be given in the future for a complete
quantitative assessment of cryptosystem efficiency and
security. This will be done especially in terms of Eve’s
optimal probability of guessing the generated key cor-
rectly, which is a more appropriate criterion than her
mutual information.
A powerful new KCQ protocol CPPM that utilizes m-
ary instead of binary detection has been presented that
could, in principle, lead to secure key generation and data
encryption over long-distance telecomm fibers. However,
the problem of obtaining such a protocol under band-
width and practical constraints remains both a theoreti-
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cal and experimental challenge.
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APPENDIX A: PROBLEMS OF QKG
UNCONDITIONAL SECURITY PROOFS
In the QKG literature, there are different types of se-
curity proofs that purport to show the existence of un-
conditionally secure protocols against any attack allowed
by the laws of physics, while new proofs are continually
emerging that we have not scrutinized. They are the
proofs of Shor-Preskill [21], Lo-Chau [37], Mayers [55],
Biham etc. [56] and recently a more complete approach
by Hamada [57]. I believe that all of them have serious
gaps that are difficult to close. The situation is rather
confusing because the strategies of these proofs are differ-
ent, and problems in one type may not arise in another.
In the following, three major problems in these proofs
are briefly described, at least one of them applies to any
of the above proofs. In addition, three other problems in
a complete protocol are briefly indicated, none of which
has been addressed in the literature, to my knowledge.
[84].
The three major problems in these proofs are
(i) It is hard to rigorously and accurately estimate E’s
disturbance on the qubits under a joint attack.
(ii) It is difficult to show there exists a universal error
correcting code that would produce the desired security
level for all attacks that pass the intrusion-level test in
the protocol with significant probability.
(iii) The side information that E has from the public
knowledge has not been properly taken into account in
the estimate of her information on the key generated.
From an information-theoretic viewpoint, a joint at-
tack from E creates in general a quantum channel with
entanglement on the user’s qubits. It seems impossible
to obtain a good estimate of E’s disturbance from merely
one copy of the general channel. This difficulty, which
may be called the inference problem, also affects the ex-
istence and the choice of a code that would perform sat-
isfactorily under all possible attacks that do not lead to
the protocol being aborted, as expressed in (ii) above.
Indeed, even for constant individual attacks this coding
problem has only recently been rigorously dealt with in
Ref. [57].
When it applies, the inference problem is serious and
does not seem to have a solution even in the asymptotic
limit n → ∞. It seems to be handled in Ref. [21] by
the argument of quantum to classical reduction adopted
from Ref. [37]. However, the local measurement actually
performed by the users is not equivalent to the nonlocal
degenerate Bell measurement needed for the reduction to
go through, with respect to the determination of the state
after the measurement that is needed in the next step of
the proof. They are only equivalent, in both the cases of
Ref. [21] and Ref. [37], with respect to the probabilities
that govern the use of the measurement results. Perhaps
the equivalence claim arose from interpreting the descrip-
tion of a measurement by the same X ⊗X differently in
two different contexts [24]. When X ⊗X has a degener-
ate spectrum, the measurement as specified by a POM is
not uniquely represented by the symbol X⊗X . Further-
more, the inference of the test qubit results to the infor-
mation qubits left cannot be justified by the quantum de
Finetti Theorem [25, 59] because quantum entanglement
leads to violation of the exchangeability premise of the
theorem, and quantum entanglement is precisely what a
joint attack can yield that an individual attack cannot.
However, the inference problem does not arise in proofs
where B makes measurements on all received qubits be-
fore proceeding. The problem of such proofs is how one
may bound Eve’s information under her optimal attack.
Note that a security proof needs to answer this ques-
tion for the user: given that a key Kg is obtained by
following the protocol on n qubits, what one can rigor-
ously say about the error profile or information that E
has onKg as optimized over all her possible attacks. This
question is especially serious for the realistic case when
the statistical fluctuation due to a finite n needs to be un-
der control. It appears that new techniques need to be
developed to handle such problem in this type of proto-
cols with intrusion-level detection. Even asymptotically,
the coding problem remains on what scheme one should
employ that guarantees a bound on Eve’s information
when she optimizes her probe/interation in anticipation
that she would receive side information later before she
makes her measurement. This problem is coupled with
the following side information problem, although the lat-
ter constitutes a problem al by itself.
In terms of our notation, the side information prob-
lem can be simply stated as follows. Let S be E’s
side information before she made her final measurement
and estimate of the generated key Kg from an obser-
vation on her ancilla. Then Eve’s mutual information
on Kg is given by I(Kg;YES). From (4), this is equal
to I(Kg;YE |S) + I(Kg;S). Most treatments just bound
I(Kg;YE). In [57], the (smaller) I(K
g;YE |S) is bounded
but I(Kg;S) is ignored. However, I(Kg;S) may grow
with the number of qubits n in x and has to be subtracted
from Kg to show that a net positive key generation rate
is in fact obtained. In this regard, we may recall that the
fundamental superiority of quantum over standard cryp-
tography is based almost exclusively on the availability of
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rigorous proofs rather than mere plausible assumptions,
qualitative arguments and numerical simulations.
The three problems that need to be dealt with in a
complete protocol that be be practically implemented
with quantifiable security are
(1) The Efficient Code Problem:
One needs to show there is a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for decoding whatever code that is utilized in the
security proof. If a non-optimal efficient algorithm is
used, its effect on security needs to be quantified. In this
connection, it may be observed that there is no rigorous
quantitative bounds on the efficiency and security levels
of the Cascade protocol [58] widely used in experimental
implementations.
(2) The Stoping Rule Problem:
As discussed in section IV, to obtain P (IE > δ|pass)
that provides quantitative security guarantee of the pro-
tocol, one needs an explicit stopping/ re-starting strat-
egy. Then one needs to bound Eve’s optimal attack per-
formance with respect to such a strategy from an appro-
priate overall criterion.
(3) The Future Key Use Problem:
When the generated key Kg is used as one-time pad or
as a seed key in a conventional cipher, a known-plaintext
attack on part ofKg can be combined with Eve’s original
probe/measurement to tell something about the rest of
the key. This problem arises also in the KCQ approach,
and shows the crucial importance of the direct encryption
known-plaintext attack problem in using keys obtained
form a key-generation protocol.
APPENDIX B: ON CRITICISMS OF αη
There have appeared three papers [60, 61, 62] in quant-
ph this year that purport to show that the αη scheme
reported in [17, 18] is insecure in various ways. These
criticisms are briefly summarized and responded to in
this Appendix.
A general criticism seems to be made in Ref. [60] that
our claim in [17, 18] on the possible use of amplifiers in
coherent-state cryptosystems cannot be valid. It is not
clear exactly what this objection is. In any event, we
qualify such use in our papers by the statement that
security must be guaranteed for E attacking near the
transmitter, since quantum amplifiers generally degrade
the communication performance. There are three specific
criticisms from Ref. [60] that one can ascertain:
(i) In the presence of loss so large that E can get 2|K|
copies by splitting the coherent-state signal at the trans-
mitter, there can only be complexity-based security.
(ii) With just a 3 dB loss, use of the Grover Search
implies there can only be complexity-based security.
(iii) The Grover Search is ‘powerful’ against
complexity-based security.
In response, observe that only complexity-based secu-
rity is ever claimed in [17, 18] against joint attack on the
key K. The other information-theoretic security claimed
is on individual ciphertext-only attack on the data. As
discussed in Section VII, it is quite sufficient to have
complexity-based security if it can be proved exponential,
which is only reduced by a factor of 2 with the Grover
Search. Long keys of thousands of bits can be used in
αη at high speed both in software and hardware imple-
mentation, making the exponential search completely in-
effective.
Furthermore, the Grover Search cannot be launched
against αη with a 3 dB loss. If it can, there is no need
for the 2|K| copies extensively discussed in Ref. [60]. In-
deed, there is no discussion there on how the Grover or
any search can be launched with a 3 dB loss. There is
a general misclaim in some papers on quantum cryptog-
raphy that a 3 dB loss on a coherent state cryptosystem
renders it insecure because E can obtain a copy of the
quantum ciphertext identical to B. This is not true even
without the use of a secret key. It is not true for B92
[8] or YK [7] or the usual-state scheme described in [51],
although it renders a coherent-state BB84 scheme and
some ‘continuous -variable’ schemes essentially insecure.
When a secret key K is used, it is not true at all. Indeed,
the possibility of key generation while granting E a full
copy to bound her performance depends on this being
not true. As explained in this paper, knowledge of the
secret key allows B to make a better measurement than
E, who cannot attain the same performance as B even if
she knows the key later.
It is true that when 2|K| copies are available to E,
there is no information-theoretic security left in a known-
plaintext attack on direct encryption, and key generation
is impossible. But it is clear that no one would contem-
plate the operation of cryptosystem over such a huge loss
2−|K| without intermittent amplifiers or other compen-
sating devices. Numerically, 2−|K| corresponds to the
propagation loss over one thousand kilometers of low-
loss fibers without amplifiers for just |K| ∼ 80 bits in αη
withM ∼ 103. It is totally out of the realm of possibility
to sustain such loss even in ordinary optical communica-
tion without cryptography. As the use of amplifiers is
suggested in [17, 18], it is hard to see why such a criti-
cism is relevant. As a matter of fact, αη in its original
form is insecure at a much smaller loss than 2−|K| for
any reasonable |K|.
In Ref. [61], it is claimed that a device can be found
that would lead to a bit error rate PEb much lower than
the quantum detection theory result ∼ 1/2 reported in
[17] for individual ciphertext-only attack on the data. As
pointed out by several others including G. Barbosa and
O. Hirota, such a device cannot exist because violating
quantum detection theory means violating the laws of
quantum physics. In Ref. [62], it is claimed that αη
is merely a classical cipher. The exact nature of αη for
key generation has been analyzed in section V, and for
direct encryption in section VII. While αη can indeed
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be run in the classical limit and even in just software,
the blanket claim that αη is classical for intermediate
and large signal energy, and hence presumably does not
permit key generation, is incorrect because their equation
(10) does not hold exactly. In particular, the discussion
around (23) in our section V.A shows how αη in just its
original form may allow key generation. For a further
concise discussion, see Ref. [63].
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